Poststructuralism and ontological hermeneutics : two non-theoretical approaches to literature and their roots in jewish though by Perets, Yael
Université de Montréal
2,iiii, 333 3, )
Poststructuralism and Ontological Hermeneutics: Two Non-Theoretical
Approaches to Literature and their Roots in Jewish Thougli
par
Yael Perets
Département d’études anglaises
Faculté des arts et des sciences
Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures
en vue de l’obtention du grade de Maîtrise (M.A.)
en études anglaises
Août, 2005
©Yael Perets, 2005
<N
*1
n
Université
de Montréal
Direction des bibliothèques
AVIS
L’auteur a autorisé l’Université de Montréal à reproduire et diffuser, en totalité
ou en partie, par quelque moyen que ce soit et sur quelque support que ce
soit, et exclusivement à des fins non lucratives d’enseignement et de
recherche, des copies de ce mémoire ou de cette thèse.
L’auteur et les coauteurs le cas échéant conservent la propriété du droit
d’auteur et des droits moraux qui protègent ce document. Ni la thèse ou le
mémoire, ni des extraits substantiels de ce document, ne doivent être
imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l’autorisation de l’auteur.
Afin de se conformer à la Loi canadienne sur la protection des
renseignements personnels, quelques formulaires secondaires, coordonnées
ou signatures intégrées au texte ont pu être enlevés de ce document. Bien
que cela ait pu affecter la pagination, il n’y a aucun contenu manquant.
NOTICE
The author of this thesis or dissertation has granted a nonexciusive license
allowing Université de Montréal to reproduce and publish the document, in
part or in whole, and in any format, solely for noncommercial educational and
research purposes.
The author and co-authors if applicable tetain copyright ownership and moral
rights in this document. Neither the whole thesis or dissertation, nor
substantial extracts from it, may be printed or otherwise reproduced without
the author’s permission.
In comptiance with the Canadian Privacy Act some supporting forms, contact
information or signatures may have been removed from the document. While
this may affect the document page count, it does not represent any loss of
content from the document.
Université de Montréal
Faculté des études supérieures
Ce mémoire intitulé
Poststructuralisrn and Ontological Hermeneutics: Two Non-Theoretical
Approaches to Literature and their Roots in Jewish Though
présenté par:
Yael Perets
a été évalué par un jury composé des personnes suivantes:
Michael Eberle-Sinatra
président-rapporteur
Andrew John Miller
directeur de recherche
Robert Schwartzwald
membre du jury
Resumé
Dès sa début, la philosophie contemporaine de littérature a été dominée par divers
courants, dont le formalisme russe, la nouvelle critique, le structuralisme, le freudisme et
le marxisme, ancrés dans la métaphysique ou la tradition philosophique « théorique »,
qui tire ses origines des théoriciens de la Grèce anciennes. Ce mémoire s’attaque à
démontrer que les deux alternatives contemporaines préférées sont les
poststructuralisme et l’herméneutique ontologique. La philosophie de Jacques Derrida
est un excellent exemple de la première approche, tandis que celle de Hans-Georg
Gadamer représente la seconde. Ces deux approches, toutefois, sont souvent
confondues. Le but de ce travail est d’établir une distinction entre elles en démontrant
qu’elles descendent de deux formes distinctes de ta pensée judaïque ancienne. On
montre que le post-structuralisme de Derrida partage plusieurs éléments fondamentaux
avec la philosophie d’Emmanuel Levinas, qui repose essentiellement sur l’ancienne
tradition rabbinique du Judaïsme. De son côté, l’herméneutique de Gadamer a beaucoup
en commun avec la philosophie de Martin Buber, basée sur l’ancienne tradition juive
«lévitique ». Ce mémoire termine en affirmant que ces deux approches ont des buts très
différents le poststructuralisrne vise la « création » et l’herméneutique
« l’interprétation ».
Mots-clés philosophie de la littérature, poststructuralisme, herméneutique ontologique,
métaphysique, Judaïsme rabbinique, Judaïsme lévitique, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel
Levinas, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Buber.
Resumé
from the outset, contemporary philosophy of literature has been dominated by
approaches, including Russian Forrnalism. New Criticisrn, structuralisrn, freudianisrn,
and Marxism, that are rooted in the metaphysical or “theoretical” philosophical
tradition, which originated with the theorists ofancient Greece. This thesis argues that
the two leading conternporary alternatives are poststructuralism and ontological
hermeneutics. Jacques Derrida’s philosophy is shown to exemplify the former and Hans
Georg Gadamer’s the latter. The two, however, are ofien conftated. This work aims to
distinguish between them by demonstrating their roots in two distinct forms of ancient
Jewish thought. Derrida’s poststructuralism is shown to share many fundamentals with
Emmanuel Levinas’ philosophy, one which draws fundamentally upon the ancient
tradition ofrabbinic Judaism. Gadamer’s hermeneutics, by contrast, shares much with
Martin Buber’s philosophy, which is rooted in the ancient “Levitical” Jewish tradition.
The thesis concludes with the daim that the two approaches have very different ends:
poststructuraÏism aims for “creation” and herrneneutics for “interpretation.”
Key words: philosophy of literature, poststructuralism, ontological hermeneutics,
rnetaphysics, rabbinic Judaisrn, levitical Judaism, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas,
Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin Buber.
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Introduction
for the rnost part, twentieth century phiiosophy of literature vas dorninated by
“theoretical” approaches — arnong them Russian forrnalisrn, New Criticisrn,
structuraiism, freudianism, and Marxism. By “theory” I mean to invoke the idea that
these are ail, uitimateiy, rnethods for approaching texts, systems of rutes that dictate how
interpreters should read. Such systerns are preciseiy what Susan Sontag opposes in her
justiy famous essay, “Against Interpretation,” in which she stipulates that “tb]y
interpretation I mean. . . a conscious act ofthe mmd which iiiustrates a certain code,
certain ‘rules’ ofinterpretation” (5). The danger oftaking such theoretical approaches to
literature is that they carry the risk of reductivisrn and hence of distorting the text. That
is one reason why rnany have corne to argue that criticism shouid move towards a stage
of “post-,” or even “anti-,” theory — although it shouid be said that by this sorne mean to
include any and ail phiiosophical reflection about literature, flot oniy the systematic,
theoretical kind.’ Regardless, the fact is that rnany have become concemed that criticisrn
lias failed to rernain open to the texts it interprets and that behind this lies phiiosophical
doctrine, especialiy ofthe theoreticai or methodoiogicai kind.
In this thesis, I shah argue that there are two major “non-theoreticai” alternatives
to theory, narnely, poststructuraiism and ontological hermeneutics (hereafier
“herrneneutics”). As describing their differences, I shah also distinguish between them
by showing how each is rooted in a distinct forrn of Jewish thought. This project is
irnportant because many have failed to distinguish between them at ail.
Thïs tendency is clearly manifested in the tities ofmany publications during the past twenty five
years. See, for example, the collections Against Theoiy and Post-Theoiy, edited by W. J. T. Mitcheli and
Martin McQuillan et al., respectively. Valentine Cunningham’s ReadingAfler Theo,y and Terry
Eagleton’s recent Ajier Theory.
2One reason for this, of course, is that both indeed oppose the theoretical
tradition. The latter’s roots are to be found in Athens rather than Jerusalem, in particular,
in ancient Greek metaphysics (indeed some have even taken to calling it just that:
“metaphysics”). The major founders ofthis metaphysics were Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotie and, as is well known, they proclaimed logos to be at the centre oftheir
endeavours. But what did they mean by this terni? In ancient Greek, the word connotes
both “thought” and “language,” although the founders invariabÏy placed the emphasis on
thought.2 This allowed them virtually to equate logos with theoretical reasoning or
contemplation (the ancient Greek word theôria means “viewing” or “contemplation”)
and indeed, as Matthew Amold would much later famously specify, the theoretician’s
aim is to attain a “perfect intellectual vision,” to grasp things as part of a unity, “as they
reafly are” (3 1, 34). Greek metaphysics, then, may be said to affirm a transparent,
monistic conception oftruth.3
Theorists ofien articulate this with metaphors of light and the seeing eye, which
for them stand for truth and knowledge. Surely the most famous example ofthis is the
cave allegory in Plato’s Republic. In it, Plato teils ofthe philosopher who leaves the
world. represented by a dark, shadow-filled cave, in order to look at the truth, the light
of the sun (Plato 515e-51 6b, 53 2h). To the metaphysician, j ust as the eye views obj ects
from an external point ofreference, capturing it in a frame and thus isolating it from its
context, the theorist must aim to do the sanie vis-à-vis his or her object of knowledge.
2 For more on the etymology of logos, see Giambattista Vico’s Tue New Science (127-8).
Ancient Greek theory was, at base, a reaction against the Homeric polytheistic world view. As
A.W.K. Adkins argues, the former represents a movement “from the many to the one” (froni the Many to
the One).
Ancient Greek metaphysics was the foundation upon which modem theory,
which originated with Descartes, is based. While the former’s ocularism and monisrn is
retained, that monism is nevertheless transformed: from an “organic” to a “systematic”
conception of unity. No longer is the whole organically present in each part, with the
parts “integrated” together; 110W each is like a separable atom and the whole is
considered a product of their systematic “interlocking” (Blattberg, ‘Loving Wisdom” 7).
As many have pointed out, modem theory’s favouring of systematic unity is inspired by
the successes ofrnodern natural science’s quest for mechanistic, measurable knowledge.
Hence those such as Immanuel Kant: “systematic unity is what first raises ordinary
knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of
knowledge” (Critique ofPure Rectson A $32, B $60). Or consider the literary theorist
Northrop frye, for whom even fictional texts may be interpreted through the lens of a
systematic theory. Indeed Frye has developed one such theory himself, a system of
literary archetypes (Frye refers to his “system” in Anatomy ofCriticisrn [3, 7, 8, 10])
that, he daims, can assist Ïiterary critics because it supplies them with a “coherent and
comprehensive theory of literature, logically and scientifically organized.. . [Otherwise
put] a unified structure ofknowledge” (11).
Modem theory is also distinct as regards its conception of knowledge. The
ancient idea according to which the knower must, in a sense, “participate” in the idea
(eidos) ofthe known has been replaced with a mechanistic approach that assumes a
dualism — and so the complete separation — of subject and object (Taylor, ‘Overcorning”
467). Truth, then, bas become a matter flot of participation but of”correspondence,”
4which is to say of achieving correct representations in the mmd of an independent,
external reality.4
Ail ofthis is associated with a particular conception oflanguage. As Jonathan
Culler has pointed out, what I am calling modem theory asserts that language should be
as transparent as possible (On Deconstrztction 91), for only this way can it serve as an
effective tool for capturing, through representation, the independent objects ofreality.
To be useful language must, like the objects it represents, be fulÏy controlÏed by its
users. Hence the need for a systematic theory of linguistics, among the rnost
sophisticated of which is one that I will examine to a degree in the first chapter below,
Ferdinand Saussure’ s structuralism.
When one thinks ofthe opposition to such theoretical approaches in Anglo
American literature departments today, the tendency is to invoke Jacques Deiiida’s
poststructuralisrn as weli as the approaches ofthose who came to be known as the Yale
critics. To them might be added schools such as New Historicism and post-Colonialism,
which, though distinct, nevertheless share rnany of their fundamenta}s with the
Derridean poststructuraiists and YaÏe critics. Indeed, one would not be wrong to include
ail of these approaches under a label such as the “philosophy of difference.” For they ail
oppose the distinctive world view of the theorist since they see the latter as distorting the
“other,” i.e.. the object that the theorist attempts to represent. To difference
philosophers, there is something violent, because “totalising” about the projects of
theory.
‘ Richard Rorty also describes this change in his Philosophy and the Mirror oJNature (3).
5Most ofthe tbinkers that could be described as theorists, as well as their
difference-affirming opponents, agree that there are indeed only two alternatives (their
own).D Those who I would identify as herrneneuticists, that is, tend to be reduced to one
or the other of these two, usually to theory by the difference philosophers and to
difference by the theorists. But herrneneutics, as T shah argue, rejects the theorist’s
ernphasis on transparency and control as well as, at least in the human sciences or
hurnanities, his or ber attempt to achieve correspondence witb a reality “out there.”
Moreover, herrneneuticists also, like the philosophers ofdifference, object to modem
theory’s dualist world view as well as to the primacy it awards to thought as distinct
from practice. Yet their approach usually gets short shrift within literary studies: as a
survey ofrecent texts in the philosophy of literature will reveal, the approach is either
overlooked altogether6 or, when not, is nevertheless given far from its due.
Terry Eagleton is among those guilty of doing the latter. Though bis now classic
text, Literwy Theoiy, does contain a discussion ofhermeneutics, it is hardly adequate.
In particular, Eagleton presents it as assuming a purely idealist conception of history,
i.e., that history is a product ofnothing other than the interpretations ofthe mmd. He
thus dismisses it for failing to grant a place to materialist considerations (73). In so
doing, however, Eagleton only echoes the Marxist critique of “vulgar Hegelianism” — as
if there ever was such a thing. For though henueneutics’ conception of tradition may
indeed be somewbat idealist, hermeneuticists are well aware that tradition is merely a
b cite but one exampte: Steven Knapp and Watter Benn Michaels divide the field ofthe philosophy
of literature into two: the “positive theory” ofthose I cali theorists and the “negative theory” of
poststructuralists (735-36).
6 Sec, for example, David Lodge, Modem Criticism and Theoiy; Peter Barry, Beginning Theoiy; and
Jonathan D. Culler, Literaiy Theoiy.
6part ofhistory. and that rnuch more happens in the latter (e.g., wars, weather, etc.) than
can be considered the product of some interpretation.
Other accounts of hermeneutics fail to identify the fundamental differences
between the romantic herrneneutics of a Friedrich Schleiermacher or a Wilhelrn Dilthey
and the ontological herrneneutics established by Martin Heidegger and developed by,
among others, his student Hans-Georg Gadamer. In so doing, those such as Paul de Man
(188) and K.M. Newton (119) only reduce the latter to the former and thus end up
criticizing the arnalgam as simpiy another version of metaphysics. As I shah show in
this thesis’ second chapter, however, this is a major distortion.
Stiil others, as I already mentioned, conflate hermeneutics with the textual
approaches of difference philosophers. A common tendency is to assume a smooth
continuation between Gadamer’s thinking, for example, and that ofthe reader-response
theorist Hans Robert Jauss.7 It is true that, as Peter Zima points out in his The
Phjlosophy ofModern Literary Theory, both Gadamer and Jauss favour the active and
alert interpreter, the reader who goes beyond “the rejection and assimilation” ofa
literary text by recognizing its “iimovative nature” and “by reacting to it in a creative
mode through changes in their horizon of expectations” (61). Yet Zirna is ultimately
wrong to lump Jauss together with Gadamer, for the latter’s notion ofpre-reflective
interpretation makes room for an unconscious or implicit response to a text — a response
that Jauss, who emphasises the reader’s productive role, simply has no place for.8
Indeed, as I shah show in Chapter 2, Jauss explicitÏy rejects Gadamer’s assumption that
Rainer Warning, for example, describes Jauss’ reception aesthetics as an “application ofGadamer’s
a-methodical hermeneutics” (qtd. in Weinsheimer 12$).
8 Cunningharn also makes this mistake (149).
7we can interpret a text pre-reflectively, prior to any conscious constitution of its
meaning (Jauss 30).
Not that ail hermeneuticists have managed to adequateiy account for difference
philosophies such as poststructuraÏism. George Steiner, for example, has ernphasized
poststructuralisrn’ s deconstructive side to the neglect of its creative, constructive one.
Indeed, his account may be said to border on caricature since he daims that
poststructuralisrn is a meaningless, empty approach that encourages nihilism (119-34).
This, too, is an error that must be avoided. That is why, again, my aim in this work wiil be
to present both ofthese distinct approaches to literature in ail oftheir integrity. Given the
restrictions of space, however, I have chosen to focus on particular cases cf each. Thus
Chapter 1 is, for the rnost part, dedicated to the poststructuraiism ofDerrida, and Chapter
2, again for the most part, to the herrneneutics of Gadamer.
My arguments for their distinctiveness proceed as foilows. In the first section of
each chapter, I give an account ofthe fundamentals ofthe approach in question by, in
particular, contrasting it with those of the theoreticat tradition. In my description cf
Gadamer’s hermeneutics in the second chapter, however, I aise include a contrast between
it and the Derridean poststructuralisrn outlined in Chapter Ï. In each chapter’s second
section. I go on to trace the connections between each approach and a distinct form cf
Jewish thought. I show that poststructuralism, as regards both its basic principles and its
exegetical practice, shares a great deal with the approach cf the Jewish philosopher
Emmanuel Levinas, who strongly influenced Derrida. As for hermeneutics, I outline the
parallels that I believe exist between it and the Jewish philosophy cf Martin Buber. Both
Levinas and Buber, moreover, hence the poststructuralism and hermeneutics that,
8respectively, share their spirits, are also shown to be rooted in ancient forrns ofJudaism:
rabbinic Judaism for the former and levitical Judaism for the latter. The struggie between
metaphysical theory and the anti-theoretical approaches in contemporary literary studies,
then, needs to be seen as much more complex than simply another manifestation ofthat
old division between Athens and Jerusalem: for at the very least we need to speak of a
divide between Athens and Jerusalems.
Yet those who have themselves explored the Jewish foots of contemporary
literary studies have tended to miss this complexity. for example, in her The $Ïayers of
Moses Susan Handelman asserts a basic division between two approaches to texts: what
she calis the “Christian patristic” and the “rabbinic.” Whule the former lias recognizably
theoretical attributes, the latter is said to include not only Derrida’s poststructuralism but
also the hermeneutics of Gadamer as well as of Paul Ricoeur (Handelman 3-25).
According to her, ail share in the rabbinic model’s assertion of metaphor as fundamental
to meaning, as well as in the rejection of Aristotelian logic’s principle of non-
contradiction (21-25). As I wiIl show, however, hermeneuticists follow the romantics in
favouring the symbol over the metaphor. Moreover, Handelman does not do much for
the cause of clarity when she also goes on to associate both Gadamer and Ricoeur with
the patristic tradition of affirming the spirit over the letter. The same must be said of
Gerald Bruns’ daim that the rabbinic tradition may be considered a form of
hermeneutics (104-23) and Donald G. Marshall’s that Gadamer shares great affinities
with both Buber and Levinas (206-14).
Just such confusing ambiguities are the targets ofthis thesis. As I want to show,
Gadamer and Ricoeur are neither rabbinic nor patristic but represent a totally different
9category: their hermeneutics is a form ofwhat we might refer to as “dialogical,” as
distinct from theoreticat or difference, philosophy. Dialogical philosophers do indeed
affirm the spirit over the letter, but not in a way that allows that spirit to be equated with
Greek thought (i.e., nous, which means pure thought) and hence theory. Handelman,
Bruns and Marshall’s approaches, then, are but more examples ofthe failure to
adequately appreciate the fundamental differences between poststructurallsm and
hermeneutics, flot to mention those between the rabbinic and levitical forms of Judaisrn.
I will nevertheless advance my arguments in this work by posing the very same
kinds of questions that those such as Handelman do, questions such as “What is a text?”
‘How is meaning conceived and expressed (i.e., should we speak of signs or symbols)?”
and “How should we understand the act of interpretation?” Ultimately, I plan to answer
these questions not so much by tracing historical influences as by ernploying a
comparative approach, one that is designed to examine the general structure ofthese two
non-theoretical approaches to interpretation. 0f course, given that I hope to develop a
coherent interpretation that clearly distinguishes the two, my own methodology could
itselfbe characterized as hermeneutical. Despite that, I stili believe that I have managed
to give not only hermeneutics but also poststructuralism its due. Yet it is, of course, for
the reader to judge whether I have been successful in my aim.
Chapter 2
Poststructuralism and Rabbinic Judaism
Introduction
In The Stayers oflioses, Susan Handelman describes what she believes to be the
profound structural affinities between the ideas of such influential thinkers as Freud,
Jacques Derrida and Harold BÏoom on the one hand and the practitioners ofthe rabbinic
Jewish tradition of interpretation on the other.’ This leads Handelman to argue that
literary studies has. for some time now, been dominated by a mode ofthought that
largely resembles rabbinic Judaism. On the whoÏe, this chapter consists of an elaboration
ofHandelman’s basic thesis. But rather than discuss the relation between the ideas ofa
number ofmodern thinkers and rabbinic thought, I shah limit my focus to Derrida’s
poststructuralisrn with the aim of demonstrating its rabbinic characteristics. I want to
identify the fundamentals shared by both approaches, and to do so in such a way as to
set the stage for the contrast between both of them and the hermeneutical approach that I
shaH develop in the foïlowing chapter.
This chapter bas two sections, each of which are further sub-divided into two
parts. In the first section, I begin by giving a detailed account ofDenida’s
poststructuralism as a whole, emphasizing, in particular, its critique ofthe principles and
practice of structuralist semiotics. Then, in this section’s second part, I develop an
account ofthe ramifications ofthis critique for the practice oftextuaÏ interpretation. The
following section begins with a presentation ofrabbinic Jewish thought, one that
highlights the parallels between it and poststructuralism. I then go on to examine the
Similar connections are also made in Geoffrey Hartman’s Midrc,sh andLiterc,tiire and José Fatir’s
Golden Doves with Silver Dots: Sein loties anci Textnality in Rabbinic Tradition.
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practice of rabbinic exegesis, focusing on the affinities between it and
poststructuralism’s exegetical approach. I should mention that, throughout the chapter, I
occasionally allude to the ideas ofthe twentieth century Jewish philosopher Emmanuel
Levinas. for I believe that Levinas, who was both an orthodox Jew and a leading
“postrnodernist” thinker, serves as an excellent intellectual bridge between the rabbinic
and poststructuralist approaches.
Section I — Poststnicturalism
Part (j) — Critique of the Metaphysics of Presence: The Case of Structuralist Serniotics
The label “poststructuraÏism” is, to a degree, inadequate. Its prefix invokes the notion of
temporal continuity, but poststructuralist thinkers do not, in fact, see thernselves as
rnerely following, flot to mention superseding, structuralisrn. This is because they also,
in a sense, admit to continue in the spirit ofthe latter, which is something indicative of
the fundarnental paradox at the heart oftheir approach: on the one hand, it adheres to
structuralism’ s core idea, the Saussurean notion of language as a semiotic system of
difference; on the other, it rejects the structuralist principÏe according to which a
linguistic system can constitute a coherent whole (e.g., Culler, On Deconstruction 23-4).
Occasionally, poststructuralist thinkers will be heard expressing this paradox when they
suggest that structuralists fail to have the courage of their own convictions (e.g., Barry
61). Poststructuralism, then, can be said to view itself as both a critique ofstructuralism
as well as a more authentic forrn of it.
Though I will, for the most part, focus on both of these approaches, I intend for
the contrast between them to have a rnuch wider application. For poststructuralists
1—
Ii
thernselves portray their project as something much grander than a critique oftheir
structuralist forbearers; to them, h is a way of subverting the entire Western theoretical
or metaphysical tradition. As they see it, structuralisrn is merely one expression ofthat
tradition. No surprise, then, that a brief survey ofDerrida’s three chiefpoststructuralist
texts — 0fGrarnmatoÏogy, Speech and Phenomena, and Writing and Difference — shows
him to target not only Saussure but also, among others, such major figures in the history
of thought as Plato and Rousseau. There is, it should be evident, something much more
fundamental going on than the attack of one linguistic theory on another.
In ail three ofthese texts, Derrida declares that we have reached the end
of an intellectual era. It is the time of the end of “philosophy” (the metaphysical
tradition) along with its attendant logocentrism.2 According to Derrida, it is the
metaphysician’s pursuit of pure, unified knowledge that is responsible for his or her
conception of Being, of everything that is, as “presence.” In 0fGrarnmatoÏogy, Derrida
shows that this conception has taken many forms throughout the history ofthe tradition,
including “presence ofthe thing to sight as eidos, presence as
substance/essence/existence . . . the seif-presence ofthe cogito, consciousness,
subjectivity, the co-presence of the other and the se1f intersubjectivity as the intentional
phenomenon ofthe ego, and so forth” (12). Metaphysicians cherish this “presence,”
Derrida daims, because they wish to achieve a form ofpower — to master, capture or
control whatever “other” has been placed in their theoretical sights. In so doing, they
assume a fundamental hierarchy of binary oppositions, ah of which are meant to support
the idea that the theorizing subject lias power over the theorized object. Among these
2 This is rnost clearly stated in his “The Ends ofMan,” where Derrida denounces both Jean Paul
Sartre’s existentialism and Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of Being as part ofthe metaphysical tradition
(indeed, Heidegger is described as the “last ofthe great metaphysicians” [36]).
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oppositions are the affirmations 0f logos over mythos. Iogic over rhetoric, the intelligible
over the sensible, speech over writing, the literai over the figurative, and the essentiai
over the contingent (Baynes, Bohman, and McCarthy 119).
following Nietzsche, Derrida daims that ail this is but a form of “will to power,”
one tied up with a certain dialectics of vision (Bornan 206). Hence the tendency of
metaphysicians to allude rnetaphorically to light and the seeing eye, which, as I
mentioned in the introductory chapter, they see as representing truth and knowledge.
Derrida’s opposition to this is based on his rejection ofthe metaphysical daim
that its conceptual orderings are truiy reflective ofthe nature ofthings. To Derrida, far
from being neutrat, metaphysics in fact consists of strategies of exclusion and
repression. Everything that is “other,” everything that cannot be contained within a
unified theory, metaphysics expels as “non-presence” or “non-being” since it assumes
that such things are not really “there.” Derrida can be said to follow Emmanuel Levinas
with this daim, Levinas having asserted that the philosophicai tradition has a tendency
to ‘iotalize,” to reduce the “Other” by forcibly incorporating it into its theoretical
strictures. In so doing, the chaiienging differences ofthe Other, its ‘infinity” ofmeaning,
become limited by virtue oftheir transformation into a seif-affinning, containable Sarne
(Levinas, Totallly I.A.4). To Levinas, and Derrida following him, the metaphysical
tradition has a tendency to “universal synthesis, a reduction of ail experience, of ail that is
reasonable, to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the world, leaves nothing other
outside of itself and thus becomes absolute thought” (Ethies 75). As Simon Critchley
describes this process,
15
[i]n seeking to think the Other, we reduce its otherness to our understanding, we
com-prehend (as in the verbs comprendre, to understand, include and comprise,
and comprehendere, to grasp or seize) and surround the Other, thereby reducing
its otherness and failing to acknowledge the otherness ofthe Other. (95)
Derrida adheres to this daim when he empliasizes the totalizing dangers of
philosophical systems. To him. the latter are able to maintain their binary oppositions
only at the cost of hidden internai contradictions, of suppressed paradoxes. That is why
he sees his task as flot so much that of reversing the oppositions asserted as of undoing
them. This requires identifying the aporias present within a given metaphysical theory’s
structure. In doing this, Detrida sees himself as calling into question the basic thesis
underiying ail such theories — the notion, again, that Being is presence. To affirm it is to
assume that knowledge is something both universal and fixed, untainted by context and
so neyer relative or in flux.
Derrida believes that this aspect of logocentrism is manifested, above ail, in its
‘phonocentrism,” its assertion of speech over writing. To make this assertion is to
assume that one can make the spoken word imrnediately and transparently present, since
the speakers are aiways there to correct those who wouid misinterpret their intended
meaning. Oniy during the moment of speech, then, can one’s intention be fully and
directiy conveyed. With writing, by contrast, the distance between the writer and reader
is made manifest and the resuit is that writers have rnuch less control over how their
texts are interpreted, hence over how their intended meaning is manifested in the world.
With writing, then, rnetaphysics loses the power and control that, as we have seen, is its
central aim (0fGrammatology 144-57).
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Derrida’s three paradigmatic phonocentric thinkers are Plato, Rousseau and
Saussure. To Plato, writing is philosophy’s illegitimate, bastard child, whule Rousseau
portrays it as a dangerous, though necessary, supplernent to speech (Derrida, “Plato’s
Pharmacy” 1844; 0fGrcmmiatology 34-43, 151, 159). As for Saussure, lie
systematically exciudes writing fiorn the general study of linguistics, claiming that it
usurps the “natural bond” between the phonic signifier and the signified (Baynes,
Bohrnan, and McCartliy 121). Below, I shah focus on Derrida’s deconstruction of
Saussure, as it serves flot only as an excellent example of Derrida’ s method but also
ahlows me to describe in more detail the paradox ofpoststructuralism’s debt to and
divergence from structuralisnt Here, however, I wish to elaborate on Derrida’s notion
that the metaphysician’s prioritizing ofpresence is associated with his or lier desire to
have power over an object ofknowledge.
Like Nietzsche, as we have seen, Derrida daims that the rnetaphysician’s
hierarchies are but manifestations ofhis or her will to power; they are constructs,
products of systems designed to provide their makers with control over the world.3 To
Derrida, in consequence, we must conceive of presence “no longer as the absolute
matrix form of being but rather as a ‘particularization’ and ‘effect.’ A determination and
effect within a system that is no longer that ofpresence but ofdifference” (Speech 147).
In so doing, as Culler has pointed out, we deprive metaphysics of its authority (On
Deconstruciion 94). For we show it to be not some innocent, impartial means whereby
This isjust one ofthe many things Derrida bas Iearned from Nietzsche, who is often read as having
inaugurated the project of deconstructing metaphysics. Nietzsche’s The l’Uit! to Power, for example,
deconstrticts the metaphysical conception ofcausation by showing that vhat is be]ieved to be a cause is in
fact an effect (293-300). And bis Genealo ofMora!s dernonstrates how the assumption that there is a
doer behind any deed isa fictive construct, a resuit ofthe imposition oflanguage’s subject-predicate
structure (45). Hence Frank Lentricchia’s description ofDerrida’s project of liberating the signifier fiom
the tyranny ofthe signified as but an elaboration ofNietzsche’s own project(175).
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we obtain universal knowledge but a power-hungry tool designed to achieve control
within a world whose reality is constituted as rnuch by non-being as by being. Derrida’s
aim, then, is to unmask the metaphysician’s dream ofmastery through pure knowledge,
doing so by demonstrating how the dream is impossible. For there can be no truly
decontextualised, fixed knowledge, no truth of origins that is not in some way
“contaminated” by what has followed, no “pure” reality lying there waiting to be
diseovered.
As I have suggested, one ofthe means by which Derrida chooses to advance this
(anti)thesis is through a kind of complicitous critique, a continuance through
supersession, of structuralism. b see how, we must first understand structuralism’s
conception of language. According to Saussure, language is a self-enclosed system. h
consists of “unmotivated signs,” that is, signs whose meanings are arbitrary and
conventional: the relation between the signifier and the signified are said to be a product
of nothing more than cultural convention. Furthermore, the meaning of a given sign is
relational or differential, since the definition of any word is a matter flot of the essential
properties of what it represents but of the differences that distinguish it from other words
(Eagleton. Literary 84). Hence Saussure’s daim that “in the linguistic system there are
only differences, without positive terms” (120). Given these realities, talk of language as
a means ofrepresenting the world must be mistaken, since no sign can correspond to
some “thing” outside ofthe system. Language, in consequence, does flot so much
represent as constitute our world.
Yet we can stiil get at the truth ofthe system that language is. That is the central
aim of Saussure’s serniotics, his science oflinguistic signs. For given language’s
systematic nature, its structures can be anaïyzed scientificaHy and hence captured by a
theory. This, of course, isjust the kind of assumption typical ofthe metaphysics of
presence.
Enter poststructuralisnt It accepts two of the aforementioned Saussurean
principles: that signs are arbitrary and conventional and that their meanings are
grounded in difference. Yet it conceives oftheir significance, especially that ofthe
second principle, very differently. To the poststructuralist, the “system” that language is
is anything but unified, and that is how it must be if there is to be meaning based upon
difference. The whole, that is, is a whole precisely because its parts do flot fully cohere,
and this means that any scientific attempt to capture it with a systernatic theory wiÏÏ
necessarily fail. What we have with a text like Derrida’s 0fGramrnatology, then, is an
attempt at deconstritcting Saussure’s semiotics.
Here is how it is done. Derrida daims that Saussure’s conception ofthe sign, the
arbitrarily connected signifier and signified, is but another case of the ancient
metaphysical opposition between the intelligible and the sensible. Derrida’s first move is
to highlight this, and he then follow it by undermining the ostensibly scientific binary
hierarchical relation. To Saussure, the signified is always prior since the signifier exists
only in order to access the signified; the signifier, that is, is merely an instrument.
Moreover, in order to distinguish between different signs the linguist must assume the
possibility of starting by differentiating between the different signifieds, for it is these
differentiations that constitute bis or ber point of departure. Hence their priority as
individual “foundations” or points of “origin” (0fGrammatoÏogy 35; Culler, On
Deconstruction 99). What we have here, then, is another case of the affirmation of a
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binary hierarchy typical ofthe rnetaphysics ofpresence, one that is only echoed by the
aforementioned Sausurrean variant of phonocentrism. For Saussure conceives of writing
as but a derivative means ofrepresenting speech, as but “an artificial and oblique
representation of a representation” (Culler, On Deconstriiction 100). Writing, then, is
considered dangerous because it infects or corrupts the ostensibly natural spoken forrn
(for example, it does nothing to prevent mispronunciation). It is thus. as DelTida points
out, but a threat to the purity of the linguistic system (0fGrarnmatology 34-43).
Derrida hence sets out to disrupt Saussure’s ostensibly naturalistic linguistic
hierarchy by showing how $aussure himseÏfundercuts the priority given to speech.
Saussure can be said to do this when he uses the example of writing to illustrate the
nature of linguistic units as differential (0fGrctnvnatology 34) because this makes
speech appear to be simply a form of writing. Derrida, then, reverses the structuralist
favouring of speech over writing, and does so by relying on the structuralist’s own
arguments. But more than that, he also argues for collapsing any distinction whatsoever
between speech and writing. He does this by showing how Saussure’s own moves irnpÏy
that both speech and writing are but species of a generalized writing, a genus he cails
“arch-writing.” This arises from a general linguistic structure that Derrida calis the logic
of the “supplement” (0fGrammatology 44, 157-64): whatever is to be considered a
“supplement” is, Derrida explains, aiways posited as secondary to that which it supplies.
Yet Derrida shows that the latter is itself also a “mere” supplement. What was at one
point considered a supplement as well as its primary source are now both supplements;
as Derrida writes in regards to one ofRousseau’s texts: “there have neyer been anything
but supplernents” (0fGramrnatoÏogy 159). This means that writing can be a derivative
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of speech only on the condition that the originally spoken meanings neyer existed
independently of or were untouched by writing. Speech, in consequence, must itself
have aiways been a forrn of writing (0fGraminatology 56).
This self-undercutting logic ofthe supplement is crucial to poststructuraÏism as a
whole. for it implies that there cannot be any perfect representation of some “origin” or
“foundation” since supplementation is possible only by virtue of its absence. Hence
Derrida’s farnous slogans: “Il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (there is no outside ofthe text) or
“il n’y a rien hors du texte” (there is nothing outside of the text) (0fGrctmmcttoÏogy 227,
233). These proclaim the absence ofany extemal reference point, ofany origin outside
ofthe signifying structure of language and hence ofany means whereby the linguist
might “capture” a given linguistic system within sorne ali-embracing theory. As Frank
Lentricchia has put it, there is “no ‘point,’ no origin, no end, no place outside discourse
from which to fix, make determinate, and establish metaphysical boundaries for the play
oflinguistic signifiers” (160-61). This means that linguistic structures based on
difference constitute endless chains of dissemination, endless deferrals of signifieds and
the differentiation of signifiers. As a result, no theory of presence is possible because, as
Culler puts it, any such theory must undo itself since “the supposed foundation or
ground proves to be the product of a differential system, or rather, of differences,
differentiation, and deferral” (On Deconstruction 109).
This is precisely the point of Derrida’s use ofthe neologism “différance.” As he
exp lains:
Diférance is the systematic play of differences, of traces of difference, of the
spacing [espacement] by which elernents relate to one another. This spacing is
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the production, sirnultaneously active and passive. . . of intervals without which
the “full” terms could flot signify, could flot function. (Positions 27)
Nothing, that is, exists outside ofthe intricate web oftextuality. Any theory ofpresence
is, in consequence, a product or effect ofthe “spacing” by which texts relate to one
another, i.e., a product of intertextuality. “Intertextuality” here does not refer merely to
the method of reading one text with another but to the fact that “every text is itself
already an intertextual event” (qtd. in Lentricchia 175). The implication is that nothing
is — or ever could be — “purely original” since any given meaning is aiways already a
resuit of intertextual events!texts. Among other things, this leads Derrida to explore the
notions of”property” and “thefi,” as he does in bis Glas, a text that is infonried by Jean
Genet’s own self-identification as a thief To Derrida, any text is always a form ofthefl
or bricolage, which is why property “even in the form of the nom propre, is [always a]
non-propre” (Hartman, Criticism 205).
Derrida’ s deconstructive rnethod, the basic aim of which can be summarized as
seeking to reveal the aporetic logic within any theory of meaning (Eagleton, Literaiy
116; MilIer 338). can thus be shown to have relevance far beyond structuralism. To say
that deconstruction’s goal is simply that of frustrating structuralisrn’s systematic projects
is thus, as J. Hillis Miller has pointed out, only partially true (4), since poststructuralisrn
goes so far as to daim that what we caïl “world” is in fact a floating concept, one
without any theoretically definable centre ofgravity. That is why Derrida can suggest,
as he does in his essay “Differance,” that “[flot only is there no realrn of differance, but
differance is even the subversion of every reaim. This is obviously what rnakes it
threatening and necessarily dreaded by everything in us that desires a realm” (qtd. in
Lentricchia 56). Derrida’s poststructuralism, then, can be said to constitute a radical
critique of ail systematic theories, for ail such theories are implicated in the assumptions
about meaning that underlie that of structuralism. The latter, in consequence, should be
considered as but one symptom ofthe Jarger sickness that Deirida identifies with the
entire Occidental metaphysicai tradition.
Part (ii) — Exeetica1 Implications
The poststructuralist (anti)thesis has direct implications for the practice oftextual
interpretation. How does poststnicturaiism answer the question ofhow we should
approach texts?
To begin with, it shouid be evident that, given daims such as Il n y a pas de hors
texte, a universe oftextuality is being assumed, one within which, moreover, travel can
neyer be shown to begin from any necessary departure point, for there is no extemal
theoretical foundation from which the interpreter must approach a text or text-analogue.
Any critique, in consequence, must be understood as a form of immanent critique. This
accounts for why poststructuralist readings usuaÏÏy attend to the minute details ofa text,
invoking its own affirmations and linguistic strategies throughout the interpretive
process. No daims are ever made on behaif of some external standard. Yet the approach
does have a definite end: that of “opening up” a given text’s “spaces.” showing, by
highlighting the contradictions within it, that the text contains aporias that allow for its
meanings as différance to become manifest.
As one might expect, the first move in such a reading wiii tend to consist of
dernonstrating how a given text exemplifies the theoretical assumptions ofthe
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metaphysicai tradition. For example, the set ofhierarchicai oppositions it affirrns will be
highlighted: what the text “means,” the text would have us believe, is a product of ail of
its parts coming together to support those oppositions. Yet the poststructuraiist reader’s
next step consists of nothing other than undoing the hierarchies by showing how the text
itse/f supports their reversai. This is then followed by their reinscription, aibeit in a
displaced manner, the oppositions in question being situated differently from how they
originally appeared (Cuiler, On Deconstruction 150). Deconstruction is thus very
different from the “destruction” that a hermeneutical thinker such as Martin Heidegger
recommends; given its concem for truth, Heidegger’s farnous “destruction” ofthe
metaphysical tradition in Being cind Time (41-49) is, as I shah show in the foilowing
chapter, much more a case of its authentic continuance tiwough transformation.
Here it is essentiai to recognize how the point of such poststructuralist readings
inevitabiy coincides with a larger philosophical message. It is that there is no escape
from the linguistic signifying system since there are no affirmations absent the “spaces”
which reveal themselves when it turns out that one can reverse any text’s binaries. Thus
does the poststructuraiist aim to repeatedly, if rnomentarily, highlight such “blind spots”
in order to make “the non-seen accessible to light” (0fGrammalology 163). As Culler
observes, however, the point is flot to “offer a firm ground for the construction of a new
order or synthesis” since deconstruction itseif “rernains irnplicated in or attached to the
system it criticizes and atternpts to dispiace” (On Deconstruction 151). What we have
here, then, is a practice ofreading and writing that is concerned, above ail, with our
attunernent to the aporias assumed to be present in any text, to what Lentricchia has
aptly calied the undecidable textuai moment[s]” (181) and what Eagleton has referred
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to as the “symptomatic” impasses of meaning (Literwy 116). The aim is not to develop
some new philosophical framework or alternative but to move back and forth “between
nonsynthesizable moments ofa general econorny” (Culler, On Deconstrztction 155) in
order to highlight their existence and thus encourage a forrn ofopenness. In many ways,
this is the opposite ofRegelian dialectics, with its struggie for the fusion ofthesis and
anti-thesis in a synthesis; indeed Derrida considers Hegel’s approach, given its obvious
involvernent in notions of directional progress, to be but another version of rnetaphysics
(Gicis). To Derrida, genuine openness requires not syncretism but the accentuation of
aporia, the revelation of the fissures and breaches present between the parts of any text
or text-analogue.
It is important to ernphasize the “double movement” aspect ofthis
poststructuralist (anti)dialectics (note the affinity here with Theodor Adorno’s notion of
Negative Dialectics — Adorno shares rnuch ofDerrida’s critique of Regel). for there is
indeed a double move when it cornes to the poststructuralist reader’s back and forth
shifis between a text’s nonsynthesizable moments. These shifts airn to critique both the
text’s affirmations as welÏ as, as we have seen, their (albeit displaced) reinscription. This
is the basis for the unique poststructuralist forrn ofcornplicitous critique that I
rnentioned above, one that has been well described by Linda Hutcheon for whom
poststructuralisrn is one ofthe major forms of “postmodemisrn.” As Hutcheon writes,
Postmodernism’s distinctive character lies in this kind ofwholesale ‘nudging’
commitment to doubleness, or duplicity. In rnany ways it is an even-handed
process because postmodernism ultimately manages to install and reinforce as
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much as undermine and subvert the conventions and presuppositions it appears
to challenge. (1)
This statement may be said to echo Culler’s account of deconstruction’s double
movement as a form of “sawing off the branch on which one is sitting” (On
Deconstruction 149), or Rodoiphe Gasché’s daim that it provides “both the conditions
for the possibility and impossibility of philosophical discourse” (100). Derrida,
however, describes it best when he writes:
to take up a position exterior to logocentrism would be to risk starving oneseif of
the very discursive or linguistic resources with which one must, of necessity,
deconstruct the tradition. Tus deconstructor is like a tight-rope walker who risks
‘ceaselessly falling back inside that which he deconstructs.’ (0f GrcimincitoÏogy
25)
That deconstruction is, largely, a forrn of immanent critique suggests that there
is sornething parasitic about it. Hence Critchley: “Derrida’s writing’s are parasitic
because they are close reading of texts that draw their sustenance from within the flesh
of the host” and that a deconstructive reading “hatch[es] its eggs within the flesh of.
[its] host” (92-3). Yet one must be carefuÏ not to go too far with this metaphor, as it risks
relegating deconstruction to a secondary status vis-à-vis the text, making it sirnply
another forrn of criticism in the ordinary sense. For ordinarily, criticism, of course,
aiways follows — neyer leads — its subject; its task is the rearticulation of meanings
already present within the original text. Appreciating the full implications of
deconstruction’s ‘logic” ofthe supplement, however, suggests that the notion of
originality assumed by ordinary criticism is fallacious. Since the daim, again, is that
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there is no such thing as a truly original text, oniy an endless chain of interrelated texts,
ail texts being, in a sense, suppiements. Otherwise put, ail texts, even those that
ostensibty serve as hosts, are in fact parasitic, and this includes those texts that are
deconstructed.4 As Adomo once wrote of criticisrn, it certainly does “do violence to the
works, but they cannot survive without it” (Aesthetic 48O).
There is another way of describing the (anti)dialectical “logic” at the heart of
deconstruction. one that highlights its implication in (as well as subversion of) the ocular
metaphors that play such a fundamental role in the metaphysical tradition.
Deconstruction, one might say, affirms the image ofthe “blinking eye” (McCumber
248; Blattberg. “Loving Wisdorn” 16); this is how we might capture its alternating — as
Paul de Man has famously ernphasized — between blindness and insight. As such,
deconstruction, as I suggested in the introductory chapter. cari be considered a form of
difference philosophy, long an opponent of mainstream, metaphysical or theoretical
philosophy.6 Difference philosophy does not, of course, simply reject “vision”
altogether; rather, it paradoxically embraces it as well as its opposite, the darkness
associated with blindness. Derrida’s altemating, complicit criticizing, his subverting and
reinscribing, is thus only a case in point, one that, as we have seen, is designed to both
In his article, “The Critic as a Host,” J. Hillis Miiler deconstructs M. H. Abrams’ daim that
deconstructionist reading is “plainly and sirnply parasitical” (qtd. in Millet 217). To Miller, the boundary
Abrams posits between host” (literature) and “parasite” (criticism) functions as a “permeable membrane”
(219) such that any text-host is also a parasite for it will participate in “the perpetual reversai ofparasite
and host” (225). Milier, then, does flot deny the notion ofthe “parasite,” rather, he embraces it by showing
how aIl texts are parasitical.
This paradoxical relationship is also expressed by Kartman when Fie writes that criticism “conserves
even as it criticizes” and that “explication becomes a genre that maintains the art work itself’ (Criticism
170, 173).
6 See, for example, Richard Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature; Martin Jay’s The Dou’ncast
Eye: The Denigration of Vision in Tweniieth-Centurv French Thought; and David Michael Levin’s
Modernity ancl The Hegemony of Vision.
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affirm and deny the “shadows” that he believes exist amidst the “lights” of any text
(consider the subtitie of one of his collections of essays: 3etiveen the Blinds). Whereas
metaphysicians strive to keep their eyes wide open, to take in knowledge and thus
achieve power over their objects, the difference philosopher aims instead to “highlight”
these attempts’ intrinsic limits. And difference philosophy does so, ironically enough, by
making visible the aporias that metaphysicians would keep hidden, shunted away in the
dark. Evidently, we are dealing with yet another forrn ofparadox here.
What are the practical implications of ail this for textual exegesis? First, it is
important to note again the contrast between the point of a deconstructionist reading and
that of more ordinary criticisrn, wherein interpretations strive for understanding. Indeed,
Derrida is quite explicit that, to him, such standard interpretations really constitute
nothing more than illusory readings (Critchley 93). Deconstruction, by contrast, is said
to aim for the “dissemination” ofmeaning, by which is meant the proliferation oftextual
readings. This is assurned possible, of course, because ofits corresponding assumption,
described above, that any signifying structure contains inexhaustibie meaning. As
Derrida suggestively asks,
[What if] the meaning of meaning (in the general sense of meaning and flot in
the sense of signalization) is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of
signifier to signifier? And that its force is a certain pure and infinite equivocality
which gives signified meaning no respite, no rest, but engages it in its own
economy so that it aiways signifies again and differs? (“force” 25)
This daim on behalf ofthe infinity ofmeanings is one reason why Derrida and other
poststructuraiists prefer such tropes as irony and parody, which exploit linguistic
2$
polysemy.7 Interestingly, metaphysicians reject them for the very same reason. Hence
their constant checking and rechecking of definitions in order to ensure language’s
efficacy as a tool for fixing meaning (Taylor, “Language” 226). As Culler points out,
word play such as the pun is arnong the forrns of language most undermining of the
metaphysician’s project since, with the pun, “an ‘accident’ or external relationship
between signifiers is treated as a conceptua relationship, identifying ‘history’ as ‘his
story’ or coirnecting meaning (sens) and absence (sans). We [if we are metaphysicians,
that is, mustJ treat the pun as ajoke, lest signifiers infect thought” (On Deconstruction
92). This wariness ofthe playfulness oflanguage is thus revealing ofthe
rnetaphysician’s fear that the thought dimension of logos will become ‘contaminated” or
“infected” by its linguistic dimension. Language must remain a thoroughly transparent
instrument of thought if it is to serve the epistemological ends of universal and a
contextual theory. That, again, is why the poststructuralist can be said to see bis or her
task as that of undermining notions of “pure knowledge” or “pure meaning” by
demonstrating the impossibility of keeping language wholly subservient to thought. For
words, poststructuralists constantly remind us, are aiways already contarninated by their
opposites (Barry 64).
Hence the frequency of Derrida’ s emphasizing the contexts of his texts. Again
and again we find him beginning a paper with references either to the locations or
situations of its writing or to its delivery should it be lectures, or both. And this is
aiways done in a way that ernphasizes how, had the situation been otherwise, so too
would the text. The point, evidently, is to underscore the historicity of bis text’s
See, especially, Rorty’s Contingencv, Irony, Solidarity, and Derrida’s “Psyche: The Invention ofthe
Other” and “Différance.”
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meanings and, in consequence, to yet again reject the universally objective pretensions
ofthe metaphysics ofpresence.
Rejecting the idea of ‘origin” and so of original, in the sense of authoritative,
texts also contributes to this goal. The rejection can be said to have at least three
implications for exegetical practice. First, as Roland Barthes has asserted in his famous
“The Death of the Author,” if there is no one original or transcendental meaning then
there is no reason for the critic to grant priority to the author’s intention.8 Second, as we
have seen, the notion ofa critical text or comrnentary as having a secondary status vis-à
vis the original interpreted text is undermined.9 And third, the very idea of marginal
texts is put into question, for the absence of a sense of origin undercuts daims on behalf
of a canon of texts, texts somehow said to be doser to the ‘universal origin” (recall
Alfted North Whitehead’s famous quip about how the European philosophical tradition
consists of but “footnotes to Plato”). Hence the poststructuralist rejection ofthe
assumption that those elements of a text relegated, say, to the footnotes are less
significant, less central or essential than those present in the main body, for there is
simply no centre or essence.10 We may even go as far as to say that poststructuralist
practice celebrates the marginal, the peripheral and the incidental.
$ To be clear, what is rejected is the notion ofauthorial intention as something fixed, as a transcendent
signification that one aims to reveal. As Culler explains, the rejection ofthe latter is done in favour ofa
notion ofauthorial intention as textual effect, one that can stiil play an important role in the process of
reading (On Deconstruction 216).
For a discussion about the fluid boundaries between art and criticism, see Hartrnan’s “Literary
Cornmentary as Literature” (Criticism 189-2 13). Hartman refers to Derrida and Adorno, for example, as
“frustrated poets” (198).
‘° Kant, who is, of course, one ofthe greatest metaphysicians, describes theparergon in his Critique of
Judgeinent as “what is oniy an adjunct” (68). Derrida asserts the diametrically opposite position in his
“The Parergon” (26, 33).
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Derrida’s exegeticai writings exemplify ail three ofthese qualities. for example,
both the general notion of intertextuality and the celebration of marginal texttial
elements are clearly evident in his “Living On: Border Lines,” which consists oftwo
texts presented side by side on the same pages rather than sequentially. Moreover, these
texts are not situated neutrally on the page; there is a “lower” and a “higher” text. and
the former, at least at first, appears to be but a cornmentary on the latter. In fact,
however, the lower text is a distinct work in its own right, and thus ought not to be
considered as in any sense subordinate to the higher. Or consider Derrida’s Glas, whose
writings on Hegel and Jean Genet are each awarded distinct columns on the page.
Between each exists an “empty” space, which leads Hartrnan to assert that “the page
fractures itselfwith blank spaces” (Saving the Texi 7). To Derrida, these spaces are
evidently as meaningful as the writing within the colurnns, for they constitute “the space
ofwriting, space as writing” Q’Plato’s Pharmacy” 1857). And as he writes elsewhere:
“[t]he spacing is not the simple negativity ofa lacuna but rather the emergence ofthe
mark” (“Signature” 1 $2).
As we might expect, poststructuralist exegetical practice is also notable for its
emphasis on the contingent elements ofany text. By attending to the text’s rhetorical
figures (its metaphors, the etymoiogy of some of its key words, their morphological
characteristics, etc.), the poststructuralist drarnatizes the contingent associations between
them, connections that repeat themselves in variotis guises in ways that contribute to the
paradoxical logic that is assumed to be present (Culler, On Deconstruction 146). The
notions of intertextuality and the dissemination of signifiers is furthermore highlighted
by invocations ofwhat Derrida calis the logic of”paleonyrnics,” i.e., the use ofold
jnarnes in order to graft new meanings upon them. In regards to this technique, one that
we will examine in more detail below, Derrida writes,
[t]o leave the new concept the old name ofwriting is to maintain the structure of
the graft, the transition and indispensable adherence to an effective intervention
in the constituted historical field. It is to give everything at stake in the
operations of deconstruction the chance, the force, the power of communication
(“Signature” 195).
This identification ofthe structure of given grafts, i.e., the points ofjuncture and stress
where one scion or une of argument bas been spliced with another (Culler, On
Deconstruction 135), is but one means whereby poststructuralists undermine the binary
oppositions asserted by a given text. This is possible because the structure ofthe graft
aiiows a plurality ofvoices (or signifiers) to simultaneously coexist. The same effect is
produced by Derrida’s technique ofwriting “sous rature,” or under erasure, in which
superirnposed “X’s” are used to strike out words or larger parts ofthe text in order to
indicate the author’s intention to erase them. Here the point is to remind the reader that
ail “final” drafts inevitably contain traces oftheir previous versions and that the latter do
not share exactly the same meanings as those ofthe “latest” version. It is also, as Gayatri
Chakravorty Spivak bas argued, to suggest that something is “inaccurate yet necessary
to say,” i.e., that there is no one “correct” signifier that points perfectly to its signified
(0fGrammatology xiii-xiv). By implication, since there is no “original” meaning to
reveal but merely chains of signifying signifiers, meaning is always provisional, aiways
like momentary “drafts.” Indeed, Spivak continues, “the authority ofthe text is
provisional, the origin is a trace; contradicting logic, we must learn to use and erase our
jlanguage at the sarne tirne” (xviii). Or, as Derrida hirnself has put it, “[a]t each step I
was obliged to proceed by ellipses, colTections and corrections of corrections, letting go
of each concept at the very moment that I needed to use it” (xviii). furthermore, by
ernphasizing how the boundary between “presence” and “absence” is flot as clear eut as
the metaphysician would have us believe, “[w]hat has been excluded is allowed to cross
the une, or to be present even when absent, like a horizon” (Hartman, Criticism 213).
Graft structures, then, atlow for the usually covert traces of meaning to corne to the fore,
rerninding the reader that the present is necessarily connected to the past (and its own
meanings)just as much as it is connected to any future expression ofrneaning that is
sure to corne along. Once again, we can see this as means of subverting the
rnetaphysician’s desire to achieve control through the assertion of meaning as presence.
This underscoring ofthe provisional nature of ail signification suggests that
interpretation is. necessarily, a never-ending process, there being no final fixed product
or meaning to be discovered by the reader. “The death ofthe author,” then, is coeval
with the “revival ofthe reader,” for the latter must be recognized as an equal (or more)
“producer of the text” (Barthes 74) since he or she determines the differential meanings
and hence creates the text’s “message” (Hartman, Criticism 16 1-88).
That, uhirnately, is why I believe the poststructuralist aims to identify. indeed
accentuate, the paradoxes latent within given texts, their moments ofconflict. For in
carefully “teasing out of warring forces of signification within the text” (Johnson 5), the
way is made for the openness necessary for creative dissemination. Hence the reference
to “war,” for the creativity of deconstruction is evidently a violent affair. Indeed Derrida
has hirnselfdescribed it as a “violence against violence,” (“Violence” 117), as ajustified
jviolent response to the totalizing violence ofrnetaphysics. Elsewhere: “[t]he space of
writing, space as writing, is opened up in the violent movement of [deconstruction’s]
surrogation” (“Plato Pharrnacy” 1 857). Others have also noted deconstruction’s violent
nature, as with Eagleton’s reference to Barthes’ poststructuralist text, S/Z, as amounting
to a forrn of”semiotic” or “interpretive violence” (Literaiy 120-2 1), or Lentricchia’s
daim that deconstructive reading is simply “an act ofhermeneutical violence. . . a
violence ofmastery and substitution” (169, 179).
Section II — Rabbinic Judaism
Part (i) — Rabbinic Judaism and the Deconstruction of Biblical Judaism
In this section, I want to identify the affinities that I believe exist between
poststructuralism and rabbinic Judaisrn. My daim is that the former is best understood
as part ofthe tradition that begins with the latter.
In order to emphasize their similarities, rny account ofrabbinic Judaisrn will
closely parallel that of the poststructuralism just described. I shall begin by suggesting
that Derrida’s philosophical project of deconstructing rnetaphysics shares a great deal
with rabbinic Judaism’s own deconstructive endeavor, namely, its deconstruction of
biblical Judaisrn. Biblical Judaism was defended by the Sadducees of the 1 st centttry
ACE, a sect that affirmed principles very sirnilar to those of the metaphysical
theoreticians (indeed, they were ofien accused ofbeing “Hellenist”). I shail then
describe rabbinic Talmudic practice, i.e., its approach to textual interpretation,
demonstrating its rernarkable echoes in poststructuralism. This discussion shah lead to a
revisiting, and a reevaluating, of poststructuralism within the field of contemporary
literary studies. In so doing, I plan to ernphasize the constructive qualities ofboth it and
difference philosophy in general, as my aïm is to show that these (anti)theoretical
projects are flot only matters of critique but also, as with the ancient rabbis, ofcreativity.
Early Judaisrn was neyer a monolithic phenomenon. Aside from the various
rninority traditions and sects, there exists a classic overarching distinction between its
biblical and postbiblical or rabbinic eras. The transition from one to the other, which
arose in response to the destruction ofthe Temple in Jerusalem in 70 ACE, was the
outcornc ofthe conftict between the Sadducees’ defense ofbiblical Judaism and another
sect’ s, the Pharisees, championing of a postbiblical or rabbinic alternative. Sadducees
and Pharisees each advocated very different conceptions ofhow Jews could and should
achieve proximity to the divine. Each ofthese were based upon very different
conceptions of scripture, of both its interpretation and its application. It is not for
nothing that Jews have been dubbed the “people ofthe book.”
There was, however, neyer any disagreement about the bible’s creation. Ah
considered it a product of the prophets, the greatest of whom was, of course, Moses.
Like artists, the prophets were assumed to have been inspired to write the sacred texts,
their inspirations arising from their mystical encounters with God. Thus may the bible
be seen a work of art; indeed, it encourages us to do so itself when we read that “Moses
spake in the ears of ail the congregation of Israel the words of this poem” (Deut. 31:30;
my translation). That the inspirations behind it are often described with ocular
metaphors suggests that the prophets were seen to share something ofthe spirit ofthe
ancient Greek theorist. For il appears that the prophets, too, needed to leave a “cave”
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and ascend in order to receive their visions oftruth: think of Moses departing from the
Israelites’ camp in order to climb Mount Sinai to receive the Comrnandrnents.
As Charles Biattberg has explained, it was fundamentally as regards the question
of hou’ to apply these commandments, known to ancient Jews as the Written Law, that
the Sadducees and Pharisees clashed (“Loving Wisdom” 11-12). The Sadducees, who
constituted the priesthood that was responsible for the operations of the Temple, saw the
biblical texts as constituting a self-enclosed, perfect unity, one amenable to literaiist
readings and hence to strict, inflexible application. As Ahad Ha-am observes, the priests
of the era airned to apply the bible in a way that knew of “no restriction either on the
side of social necessities or on that of human feelings” (“Moses” 313). Once again we
may draw a parallel between this conception of the bible and the metaphysician’s
theory, for both are said to be meaningful in a fundamentally nonrelative, non
contextual sense.
Hence the Pharisees’ complaint that the Sadducean approach was “too Greek.”
Partly, of course, this reflected a desire to lead the movement against the Hellenist
colonial rule of the day. Yet one also cannot ignore the many Pharisetic exhortations
against appiying sacred texts in a literai way. for example, in the Babylonian Talmud
we find: “Jerusalem was only destroyed because judgments were given strictly upon
biblical law and did not go beyond the requirements ofthe law” (Epstein, Baba Mezia
30b). To the Pharisees, it is clear, the bible’s perfection needed to be conceived
differently: instead ofthe simple unity ofthe Sadducees, it was believed to be unified in
a paradoxicai way. As Ha-am has described it, such a whole
captivates us by its many-sided beauty. . . [it is] the resuit of a struggle between
certain primal forces, which are themselves simple and one-sided; and it is just
this one-sidedness ofthe elements, each of which strives solely for its owu end,
but neyer attains it, that produces the complex unity, the established harmony of
the whole. (“Prophet and Priest” 119-20)
If one is to read such a text and remain true to its “complex unity,” then, one must read
in a way that emphasizes the conffict, and hence the spaces, between its parts. Otherwise
put, there is nothing here to be applied literally because the whole is essentially a set of
paradoxes, a work whose parts are fundamentally in conflict with each other.
Faced with the Sadducean assertion of monistic unity, then, the Pharisee
attempted its deconstruction, thus revealing the presence of a complex unity instead.
Levinas, a great rabbinic reader of the bible and the Talmud, has suggested that this
Pharisetic approach resembles DelTida’ s (Davis 111). ‘ And what is the Talmud if not a
collection of conflicting biblical interpretations, few of which can be said to cohere with
each other? To the rabbinic Jew, it only shares this quality with the bible.
This divergence between the Sadducees and Pharisees over how to conceive of
the bible can be associated with divergent epistemologies. On the one hand, as we have
seen, the Sadducee sees a text capable of being read literally, given that ail of its parts
cohere perfectly within a simple unity. The bible is thus assumed to be accessible to a
rational process much like that required for comprehending a metaphysical theory — its
meaning is present as a flxed entity, “out there” and thus accessible to the disengaged
For more on this, see Martin C. Srajek’s In the Margins ofDeconstruction: Jewish Conceptions of
Ethics in Eininanue/ Levinas andJacque Derrida (246-$4).
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rational interpreter. Given the centrality ofthat bible to the life ofthe Jew, we may say
that the Sadducean approach is as logocentric as that of any Greek metaphysician.
To the Pharisee, however, the meauing ofbiblical text cannot be “present” in this
way, as like some unified object waiting to be discovered. Rather, it must be crealed,
something that is possible specificafly because ofthe “cracks” or “spaces” that lie between
its conflicting parts. These serve as invitations for the sacred, for God’s spirit (the
$hekhinah) to flow through them and inspire those who would “read” the text. To approach
that text with the unifiing reasoning of logos, then, wouid only close those cracks and make
the whole into a “totality.” Hence the Pharisetic need to deconstruct Sadducean readings,
much as the poststmcatralist would later cali for a violent response to the violence of
metaphysical theory.
As José Faur bas expiained, ail ofthis assumes a semiotic conception ofrneaning in
which, as we have seen, language is conceived as a system of signs. Consider the metaphors
contained in the bibiicat expression “golden doves with siiver dots” (Songs 1:11).
“Golden doves” designates “ideality,” the pristine stage ofthe idea as it exists,
ostensibly, in pure thought, prior to articulation in language. This is identified with the
divine oracuhim, with God’s meaning before it has been expressed in human language.
‘Silver dots,” by contrast, refers to the signifiers of this meaning, to the oraculum as
reflected in language and communicated to the people of Israel (faur 114-15). Together,
then, we get signs. connections between signifiers and signifieds.
Yet to the Pharisee, such signs are only constituted as meaningful because of the
creative process described above. For nothing rneaningful is simply there, present and
waiting to be reflected by reason; rather, it must be the product of received revelation.
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faur himself points to the affinity between this Pharisetic notion and Saussure’s
distinction between the concept ofthe sign and its linguistic value: the latter arises only
when an association or opposition of a term to other terrns in a linguistic system bas
been produced. b the rabbis, this parallels their distinction between the linguistic
concept (shctrah) and the generation of new meaning through the relation between terms
in the whole linguistic system (ma ‘na) (Faur 72-5). for an example of how the rabbinic
interpretive process is a matter of creatively modifying the signified, consider the
Talmud’s treatment ofthe incident ofJacob’s wrestling with the angel (Gen 32:25). As
Rabbi Joshua ben Levi comments: “It teaches. . . that they raised dust with their feet
until it reached the Devine Throne.” The Hebrew term for ‘and wrestled” (vciyve ‘abeq)
is etymologically associated with that for “dust” (abacj). Hence the Talmud’s
extrapolation: “and they [wrestled] raising dust with their feet.” Thus does ben Levi
modify the usual sense of “wrestling,” a move that makes way for granting it a sacred
aspect since, as the rabbi goes on, ‘they raised dust with their feet until it reacbed tbe
heavens.” This very sarne image, moreover, serves as an allusion to the laterjourney of
the Israelites in the Sinai desert, continuing the creative associations (faur xix).’2
This kind ofcreativity is exactly what’s aimed for by the Pharisetic conception
ofthe “study” of Torah (sacred texts). Whereas the Sadducees would apply a complete,
unified product, the Pharisees emphasize how a text’s meaning, absent its interpreter, is
necessarily incomplete. The difference here bas been well captured by faur’s distinction
between an approach that ernphasizes “product,” which he identifies with the
rnetaphysics ofpresence, and one — the rabbinic — that emphasizes “process” (xxvii).
12 For more on rabbinic semiotics, see Faur (139-42).
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Moreover, instead ofendorsing biblical Judaism’s duo ofprophet and priest, the former
making and the latter adhering to the letter ofthe law, the Pharisees celebrate the sages,
the rabbis, for their creative contributions to Torah. As the Talmud declares: “since the
day when the temple was destroyed, prophecy has been taken from the prophets and
given to the wise” (Epstein, Baba Bathra 12b). The sages’ creativity is understood to
corne from their participating in highly polemicat debate about a sacred text’s meaning.
The idea here is that the adversity will serve to augment the divisions, and so the spaces,
between the interpreters as well as the parts of the text that they are interpreting. Such
spaces, as we have noted, are considered essential for revelation, for the reception of
creative inspiration. So the aim is neyer to arrive at a consensus over any single
interpretation of the text, to reconcile opposing positions; rather, as Levinas has
described, it is
to rub in such a way that blood spurts out is perhaps the way one must ‘nib’ the text
to arrive at the life it conceals ....[reading] can only consists in this violence done
to words to tear from them the secret that time and conventions have covered over
wiffi their sedirnentations, a process begun as soon as these words appear in the open
air ofhistory. One must, by mbbing, remove this layer which corrodes them.
(“Temptation” 46-7)
Elsewhere, Levinas even refers to the debate between the students of sacred text as a
“combat that trades verses like blows” (Dfficult freedorn 72). The result of such struggle?
New, creative interpretations and hence new Ïaws, the basis ofwhat the rabbis caÏÏed
“Oral,” as distinct from “Written,” Law (the former, ironicaHy enough, were written
down with the redaction ofthe Talmud during the second century ACE). And these texts
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are then, in turn, thernseÏves subject to the very same kind ofadversarial polemics,
making way for yet more such revelatory creativity.
There is a theological dimension to ail this, of course. The rabbinic emphasis on
revelatory exegesis is based upon a belief that God Hirnself is inscribed in the Jewish
texts (this inscription, it goes without saying, being distinct from the incarnated God of
Christianity [Davis 106-7]). Contrary to the classic Christian caricature ofthe Pharisees,
then, one that Matthew Arnold invokes in his classic distinction between Hellenisrn and
Hebraism (136),13 rabbinic Judaisrn is not sirnply a matter ofthe strict observance oflaw in
the sense of obedience to its letter and not its spirit. What is exacting and rigorous about it is
not how it applies the law but its determination to do so through revelatory exegesis (Davis
103). Ibis, moreover, is assumed to be sornething that will be done differently by every
interpreter, since each individual must receive given inspirations in their own way.
Revelation, in consequence, is not seen as sornething that occurred once and for ail on
Mount Sinai; rather, it is assurned to be repeated and modified with every act of exegesis
(Davis 112). There is thus a kind of(creative) freedom here, albeit one that will aiways be
“difficuÏt,” as Levinas describes, for it is said to require both intensive and adversarial
“study, debate and deliberation” (Dfficïdt freedorn 15).
Let us restrict our focus for a moment to Levinas’ thought since, as I suggested
above, it serves as an excellent bridge between the two approaches whose affinities T am
striving to identif here: the difference phiiosophy exemplified by poststnicturalism and
rabbinic Judaism. In his book, TotaÏity and Jnfinity, Levinas criticizes metaphysicai
Arnotd also fails to distinguish between different forms of Hebraism, the rabbinic being flot the only
one. Other Judaisrns include Chasidism, a form ofrnysticism combined with magical rites and, as we wilI
see in the next chapter, Levitical or dialogical Judaism. Contemporaiy secular Judaisrn, too, has an
integrity alt its own.
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philosophy’s assumptions about phenomenology and ontology. As Davis specifies,
Levinas’ central question is: wbat is there apart from Being? Or, given that Being is
coextensive with the whole of reality itself: what is there apart from eveiything? (34).
Western philosophy. Levinas daims, lias been occupied exclusively with that which can be
incorporated into a system of knowledge. Yet it does so in a way which assumes tbat there
is nothing that cannot be known and hence controlled. Levinas refers to the epistemologicai
stance underlying this as the “totality ofthe Same,” (Totaflty 40) for anything that bas been
incorporated into a system of knowledge may be said to have been reduced, comrnensurated
— no longer is any aspect of it worthy of the designation “other.” Levinas, however, would
have us make room for jtist such an “Other,” for tbat whicb is “out-side-of-everything,”
which he invokes with sucb terrns as alterity, transcendence, exteriority, or infinity (TotaÏity
34). This otherness is not sirnply opposed to the Sarne. for the relation between the two is
not a matter of either-or (Levinas’s book’s title, afler ail, is Totallty and Inflnïiy). Levinas
rejects such stark oppositions because, as he puts it, “[i]fthe Sarne were to establish its
identity by simple opposition to the oïher [or vice versai, it would already be part ofa
total ity encompassing the Sarne and the Other” (Totalit 38). Hence the main defect with
the metaphysical tradition:”[tihe Other is acknowledged only in order to be suppressed or
possessed; as in the workings ofthe Hegelian dialectic, the characteristic gesrnre of
phiÏosophy is to acknowledge the Other in order to incorporate it within the expanding
circles ofthe same” (Totcilily 40). To resist the totalizing this implies, it is thus necessary to
recognize that the Other must not, indeed cairnot, becorne an object ofknowledge or
experience since that would be to appropriate it, to take control over it for oneself and hence
to negate its otherness: ‘know1edge is always my knowledge, experience always my
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experience; the object is encountered only in so far as it exists for me. and imrnediately its
alterity is diminished” (Davis 41). Instead of affirming only unifled totality, then, Levinas
caïls on us to grant a place to in±inity — infinite meaning — by recognizing that “[tihe infinite
is the absolute other.” (Totality 49) It is, of course, a short step from this to the unabashedly
religious daim, namely, that “God is the Other” (TotaÏiiy 21 1).
OtÏlen1’ise thcin Being, Levinas’ second major work,’4 continues on in this vein,
ahhough in it Levinas substitutes the terminology of Sarne and Other with that of “the said”
and “the saying.” “The said” comprises statements and propositions about the world, truth,
Being, personal identity, etc., that are susceptible to established rational protocols of dispute
and verification, i.e., to the strictures ofrnetaphysics. As Levinas stresses, Western
philosophy is preoccupied with this “said.” ignoring “the saying” altogether, by which he
means Ïltrning away from any genuine encounter with the Other. “The saying” is the site
wherein exposure to the Other takes place; it is the place (which is also a no-place, a utopia
tOlheivise 45]) wherein one gets close to it, and thereby to an infinity of meaning that
cairnot be reduced to what is. to Being (Davis 76). The saying, then, is a fonri of creation.
How can one manage to overcome the metaphvsical tendency to grant primacy to
“the said” and occlude “the saying” ofthe Other? Levinas’ response, as the reader might by
now expect, is to cail for a deconstructing form of violence: “[i]n order to suppress
violence,” [i.e., the violence done by the reduction of ‘the saying to the strictures ofa
11 The book, it is worth mentioning, was largely a response to Derrida’s critique of Totaflty andlnfinitv
in his article “Violence and Metaphysics.” That text consists ofa deconstruction ofLevinas’, showing it to
stili share rnany ofthe aspirations of rnetaphysics. lndeed, as Robert Bemasconi has pointed out, Derrida
is Levinas’ chiefinterlocutor in Otheru’ise than Being(149). I will examine Derrida’s text below.
‘ Levinas stresses that while “the said” is susceptible to protocols of dispute, “the saying’s” inflnity of
meaning cannot be reduced to such verifying procedures (Othenvise 179). Note the similarities with Jean
François Lyotard’s notion of”the differend,” about which Lyotard asks “What tribunal can know and rule
on the differend between the ethical phrase (inflnity) and the speculative phrase (totality)?” (115).
Lyotard’s Doctorat d’Etai, it is worth mentioning, vas heavily influenced by Levinas’ writings.
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theoiy ofknowledge] “it is necessary to have recourse to violence” (“Transcendence and
hauteur” 92, rny translation). The echo ofPharisetic practice here should be unmistakeable.
Just as the Pharisees cail for “violent” polernical study ofthe Written Law contained in the
Hebrew bible, one designed to accentuate the conflicts, the paradoxes, latent in the text,
Levinas calls for the same vis-à-vis the totalizing affirmations ofrnetaphysics. Only this
way, he believes, can the West manage to achieve openness to its others and so to new
meanings. As Levinas writes in Beyond the Verse:
[the] inexhaustible surplus ofmeaning rernains locked in the syntactic structures of
the sentence, in its word-groups, its actual words, phonemes arid letters, in ail this
materiality ofthe saying which is potentially signifying ail the time. Exegesis would
corne to free, in these signs, a bewitched significance that srnoulders beneath the
characters or cous up in ah this literature ofletters. (109)
To Levinas, it is evident, ail texts, not only sacred Jewish ones. can serve as the bases of
creativity, for “evely text is inspired: it contains more than it contains” (Beyond 171).
This creation through exegesis must welcome paradox, the conflicts, hence the
spaces, internai to any text. For reveiation is but an “an unforeseen and unforeseeable
breach within what is known and knowaNe” (Davis 47). The same may be said ofLevinas’
own texts. Their purposively elusive and highly disorienting style, their “saying[s] that must
also be unsaid” (Othenvise 7), are designed to encourage the reader to be open to their own
spaces, and so to the inspirations that may flow through them. As such, they mimic the
plurality ofconflicting and aiways unresolved assertions present in the bible and, more
explicitly, in the Talmud.
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Revelation is flot limited to such texts. To Levinas, it is also associated with what he
cails the “face” ofthe other. By this he means to allude to the spaces that he believes are
situated within the soul of each and every individual human being. Openness to them, then,
can make way for “an epiphany or revelation” (Davis 46). The encounter with such “faces”
is flot a matter of phenomenological perception since it is a “relation without relation”
(TotaÏlly 80): it is a relation because an encounter does, after ail, take place, but it is
“without relation” because it is flot a matter of parity or of achieving understanding or
recognition. For that, Levinas suggests, would be to employ the rational, totalizing means
that deny the otherness of the Other and thus to close ourselves off from the creativity that
can only corne from being open to it.
This creativity is also, for Levinas, a matter ofethics. For just as the first
comrnandrnent revealed to ifie ancient Israelites was “Thou shaït flot kili,” Levinas believes
this to be the first message one receives from a revelation that arises from being open to ifie
“face” ofa given other (Totaliiy 199). And as between God and the Israelites, there is an
asymmetrical relation between self and other in ail such revelation, for “since the Other
looks at me, I am responsible for him, without even having taken on responsibilities in his
regard; bis responsibility is incumbent on ne” (Ethics 96).
It should be evident that the practice of Talmudic exegesis or openness to the other
is flot only a matter of opposing rnetaphysics’ denial ofthe “Other,” and so ofdestroying,
through deconstniction, the barriers it sets up. For the point of bringing down those barriers
is that something productive may arise, namely, creative revelation inspired by (or, beffer,
through) the other. Subversion is thus only a first step, a “highlighting” of shadows, of dark
aporias, in order to make way for the light of inspiration. Once again it becomes appropriate
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to refer to the metaphor ofthe “blinldng eye” in order to sum up this approach, for the point
of its closure, and so of darkness, is to clear the way for the inspirational light, something, as
we have seen, that is cherished as rnuch by Greek metaphysics as by rabbinic revelation.
0f course, this double movement of subversion and reinscription is also central to
Derrida’s poststnicturalism. Recognizing this only adds irony to Derrida’s “Violence and
Metaphysics,” which, again, is essentially a commentary on Levinas’ Totallly andlnflniiy.
In this essay, Derrida suggests that Levinas’ work fails in its intent to overcome the
metaphysical tradition. Yet it could be said that Derrida does so only in order that the
accusation wiii rebound back on his own writings, for they, too, are equally guilty ofthe
sarne offence. There is an important reason for this, one that has been weil described by
Étienne feron when he says that Derrida’s argument “consists of recognizing that
philosophical discourse can only say the Other in the language ofthe Sarne” (260, my
translation). All this is in keeping with rabbinic Judaism, since without the Wriflen Law, and
so the Greek or Sadducean pretensions to unity, the rabbinic work of accentuating aporias
would have no setting. lndeed, those settings are ail the more appropriate for their authors’
attempt to present them as unified, as this only makes their deconstruction that rnuch more
effective, that rnuch more fragmenting. After ail, the boomerang aiways cornes back harder
the further it is originaiiy thrown.
Derrida’ s critique is ofien considered to be responsible for the further radicalizations
of aporetic style and structure evident in Levinas’ Othenvise than Being. As Levinas writes
ofthat text, it aims to achieve “an incessant unsaying ofthe Said [as a result of] rnovement
going from said to unsaid in which the meaning shows itseff, eclipses and shows itself In
this navigation the element that bears the embarkation is also the element that submerges it
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and threatens to sink it” (Otherit’ise 181). There is clearÏy no attempt here to realize
metaphysics’ goal of moving unidirectionally from darkness (which, it is assumed, equates
with ignorance) to light (knowledge). Rather, we have an alternating interplay of shadow
and reflection, one which implies that “light (or enlightenment) is [merely] an occasional.
perhaps even accidentai, effect ofphiiosophical enquiiy” (Davis $6). Yet it isjust as rnuch
an essential effect, as this accounts for why, to Levinas, there can be no Saying without the
Said: though the Saying “is neyer fully present in the Said, yet the Said aiso constitutes the
only access we have to it; it leaves a trace on the Said but is neyer revealed in it; it is flot a
therne, but can only be discussed in terms ofthemes” (emphasis added, Othenvise 3 7-8; 45-
8). What we have here, one might thus say, is a practice that does flot so much affirm
Jerusalem against Athens, as Jentsaiem and Athens against Athens.
Part (ii) — Exegetical Implications
On, then, to the topic ofrabbinic Judaism and exegeticai practice. As I shail show, the
parallels with poststructuralism are striking.
To begin with, there is the question ofthe authoritative status of given texts. As we
have seen, the Pharisees called for replacing the application ofbiblicai, Written Law by its
“study,” by which is meant the creation ofnew, Oral Law. One resuh ofthis was that it
meant that both the new and the old laws were equaIiy authoritative. This is a position that is
strikingly different from that of most approaches in literaty criticism, according to which
critical texts are by definition derivative, the true “genius” residing in the original objects of
interpretation. The Talmud, however, is viewed as a set of “secondaiy” texts only in terms
of sequence: it is as holy as the bible (indeed, until relatively recently, at least within the
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circles of conternporary ultra-orthodox Jewiy, the latter lias been relatively neglected). Ibis
parallels the poststructuralist’s cail for blurring the boundaries between fiction and
nonfiction. not to mention for skeptically inteirogating the contemporary canon. And who
can miss the way in which, for many poststructuralists, their projects should be considered
creative works in their own right? Ihis is ftilly in keeping with rabbinic Judaism’s emphasis
on the process over the product ofa reading, for the aim of the poststructuralist critic is not
to “get it right,” to constmct a “trie” account of the meaning of a text, as to use the spaces in
that text to create anew.
Moreover, for similar reasons, both approaches can be said to demote, or at least
reconceive, the autbority ofthe autlior’s intent. “Dernotion” is obviously going to be
inappropriate when it cornes to rabbinic Judaism’s prime author, namely God, yet it is
nevertheless clear that, unlike with the Sadducees, God is not seen to have monopoly over
the meaning of His sacred texts. There is a wonderftd Talmudic tale, described by Gershom
Sholem as one ofthe most famous passages in Jewish literature, which illustrates precisely
this point. It teÏÏs of an interpretive dispute among a group of rabbis, and is worth quoting at
length:
On that day Rabbi Eliezer brought forward ail the arguments in the world, but they
were flot accepted. He said to them: “If the HaÏakha [the proper decision] agrees
with me, let this carob tree prove it.” Thereupon the carob tree was uprooted a
hundred cubits from its place; some say, four hundred cubits. They replied: “No
proof may be brought from a carob tree.” Then lie said: “If the Halakha agrees with
me, let this stream of water prove it.” Thereupon the stream of water flowed
backwards. They replied: “No proof rnay be brought from a stream ofwater.” Then
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he said: “If the Halakha agrees with me, let the walls ofthe schoothouse prove it.”
Thereupon the walls ofthe schoolhouse began to totter. But Rabbi Joshua rebuked
them and said: “When scholars are engaged in halakhic dispute, what concem is it
ofyours?” Thus the walls did flot topple, in honor of Rabbi Joshua, but neither did
they return to their upright position, in honor of Rabbi Eliezer; stiil today they stand
inclined. Then he said: “If the HaÏakha agrees with me, let it be proved from
Heaven.” Thereupon a heavenly voice was hard saying: “Why do you dispute with
Rabbi Eliezer? The Halakhah aiways agrees with him.” But Rabbi Joshua arose and
said (Deut. 30:12): “Ris not in heaven.” What did he mean by that? Rabbi Jeremiah
replied” “The Torah has already been given at Mount Sinai [and is thus no longer in
Heaven]. We pay no heed to any heavenly voice, because already at Mount Sinai
You wrote in the Torah (Exod. 23:2): One must incline afier the rnajority.” Rabbi
Nathan met the prophet Elijah and asked him: “What did the Holy One, blessed be
He, do in that hour?” He reptied: “God smiled and said: My children have defeated
Me, My chiidren have defeated Me.” (Sholem 29 1-2)
The determination ofmeaning, it is evident, is sornething that must be done in the midst of
the (ever-changing traditions ofthe) comrnunity. There is no single, fixed, perfect
interpretation, for the point is not, as hermeneuticists from Bamch Spinoza to E.D. Hirsch
have clairned, to get at the author’s original intention. Rather it is, again, to create anew.
Indeed the Talmud presents itself as a text independent ofits authors (faur 119, 122). Yet
another farnous Talmudic tale corroborates this: afler his death, Moses is said to have
been brought before a lecture being delivered by the great sage Rabbi Aldba. Disconcerted
by bis failure to understand the lesson, Moses is surprised to hear Akiba attribute his
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wisdorn to the revefation made to Moses hirnself long ago at the foot of Mount Sinai
(Levinas, Beyond 134). The moral? The author flot only does flot decide the meaning of his
text, he may flot even understafld it. 0f course, all this is only echoed by the famous daims
ofpoststructuralists about the “death ofthe author” (e.g., again, Barthes’ “The Death ofthe
Author”; or see also Michel Foucault’s “What is an author?”).
The reader, then, is flot only a receiver; he or she is also a producer. b Levinas, we
ought to see the retationship between reader and text as one ofrnutual solicitation. Readers
solicit the text with their particular interests in mi, and they are in tum solicited by the text
to explore its meaning, one to which that reader’s interests make an indispensable
contribution (Beyond 134). Consider Levinas’ own Talmudic commentanes. As Colin
Davis points out, they ofien begin by addressing thernes that appear to have little or no
connection to the text in question (110). Levinas also highlights the Talmud’ s own emphasis
on the indispensable nature ofeach and eve;y cornmentary, each of which is seen as adding
to the meaning of the text, as realizing something that would neyer have corne into being if
not for the unique identity ofthe given interpreter. On its own, then, a text is a dead thing,
one brought to life only when the reader approaches it with an openness to what it might
inspire. There is an evident celebration ofthe plurality of possible readings here, the
assumption being that contrary views may all have validity because their proponents ail
have access to a unique aspect ofthe trnth, one emanating from the text. This is ceilainly a
relativist conception, akhough Davis is right to distinguish it from relativism in the
“anything goes” sense (115). For as Levinas explains, we need to distinguish between a
genuinely creative reading and the fantasies of amateurs:
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this is made both by a necessaiy reference ofthe subjective to the historical
continuity of reading, and by the tradition of commentaries that cannot be ignored
under the pretext that inspirations corne to you directly from the text. A ‘renewal’
worthy ofthe narne cannot avoid these references, any rnore than it cmi avoid
reference to what is known as the oral Law.” (Beyond 135)
The parallel witb poststrucmralisrn’s practice ofopenness and yet respect for certain
protocols ofconduct (Culler, On Deconstrttction 189) is striking.
The Talmudic stoly about Moses cited above can also be read as pointing to the
rabbinic stress on the context dependant nature of any and all textual conmentary. Both the
bible and the Talmud are oflen portrayed as invitations to explore the relationship between
their context and that oftheir current readers. This exploration is considered part ofthe
‘rnotor” that generates revelatory creativity. So as the reader’ s context changes over time, so
too will bis or her readings, this making way for new textual interpretations. Meaning, then,
is inexhaustible and commentary a neyer ending process. Levinas can be read as implying
these very points by bis frequent employment of such deictics, indicators of time and place,
as “now,” and “here” (Davis 113). That textual meaning is always provisional injust such
ways is, of course, also central to poststmcturalisrn, Derrida’s texts being thoroughly
sufftised with anecdotes and, as we have seen, references to their contexts of both
composition and delivery.6
The circumstantial nature of meaning is also emphasized by Talmudic readers when
they give carefril attention to such minute textual elements as the similarities between
words, unusual spellings, the nurnerical values of words, etymologies, and other details that
6 Considerjust his “Ulysses Gramophone,” which contains a description ofhis trip to a post office in
Japan.
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derive from Hebrew syntax. As David Banon lias pointed out, for example, Talmudic
readers ofien explore highly diverse possible readings of a single word, an exercise
facilitated by Hebrew’s being a consonantal language (89-90). This can be considered an
example of focusing on what poststmcturalists refer to as contingent textual characteristics,
since poststnicturalists ofien assume the significance of what others tend to consider merely
“ornamental” or “accessory” aspects of a text. The tendency of poststructuralists to
ernphasize the parergon of a text is a case in point; in so doing, they only echo their
ancient Talmudic forbearers for, as faur lias pointed out, the rabbis also ofien strove to
generate meaning “from elements devoid of lexical sense, [from the] ‘external’ or
‘circumstantial “(xxviii).
Derrida’ s notion of meaning as a product of iteration may be considered another
species ofthis genus, one that recalls the fact that the Hebrew root ofthe word Mishna
(which is the title oftexts containing authoritative accounts ofthe Oral Law), SHaNaH,
means both “to repeat” and “to change.” This points to the dual nature of iteration as
both transmission and change. for one can neyer truly simply “repeat” since each and
every iteration will always exist in an at least somewhat different context. As faur
suggests, this is how we should conceive ofthe notion of traditions: they caimot be inert,
unchanging things sirnply passed on from one generation to the next, for those
generations’ different contexts will ensure that each transmission also brings about
change (52-4, 146).
It is in this context that we can understand the famous Talmudic saying that
“there are seventy faces to the Torah.” For this is certainly a polysemic work, one that
celebrates the diversity of possible interpretations and our ability to unlock its “inexhaustible
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surplus ofmeaning.” (Levinas, Beyond 109). The Talmud, then, should be seen as a network
of texts that continually refer to each other as part of a restless immanent polemics. This
intertextuality is evident even in the structure ofthe Talmudic page, upon which different
commentaries are situated side by side within different colunrns. $hould one not have a
Talmudic tractate handy, il is enough to glance at a page ofDerrida’s Glass for an example
of this.
furthennore, it was aiways fundamental to the rabbinic tradition that bÏank spaces
between the letters were meaningful in their own right and not merely means of keeping
letters distinct. As Faur puts it, “whiteness of the parchment between the letters is what
contains (and in effect gives expression to) ... writing” (116). Indeed, if it is
determined that even a single letter of sacred text has been displaced due to the need to
print around a hole that has punctured the parchment, then the scroil in question is said
to be invaÏid and hence wholly unfit for liturgical purposes (faur 116). For that is what
the paradox of complex unity demands.
Conclusion: “Greek-Jew, Jew-Greek”
In this chapter, I have attempted to draw a series of parallels between the metaphysical,
theoretical phiÏosophy tradition and biblical Judaism, on the one hand, and poststructuralism
and rabbinic Judaism, on the other. Moreover, I have also tried to emphasize the similarities
between the critiques advanced by the partisans ofthe second pair against the first. Both of
the latter fear that the former encourage a form of “totalization” that closes us off from the
“otherness” of meaning in (and beyond) the world, and so from creativity. To rabbinic Jews,
of course, this othemess is aiways a flinction ofthe Other, namely, God, a religious position
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that is certainly not shared by ail poststnicturalists. But it does flot have to be, since the
arguments made are, as we have seen, inescapably iinguistic, their validity (or Iack thereof)
resting upon nothing other than their success (or failure) at accounting for phenomena that
can be conceived in a whoÏÏy secular fashion. As the rabbis themseives have toÏd us, “it is
flot in Heaven.”
No surprise, then, that many have identified Derrida, the father of
poststructuralism, with some forrn or other ofHebraism.17 More significant, however, is
DelTida’s OWH decision to close bis two essays on the Jewish poet Edmond Jabès with
signatures that aiiude to the rabbinic inheritance of bis ideas: “Edmond Jabès and the
Question ofthe Book” is signed by “Reb Dida,” and “Ellipse” by Reb Derissa.
Anagrammatically. as Allan Megiil bas pointed out, it is clear that the writer in question
means to identify himself as non other than Rabbi Derrida (319).
7 In Saving the Text, Geoffrey Hartrnan characterizes Derrida as “Hebrew rather than Hellene” (17).
Moreover, Douglas G. Atkins specifically associates Derrida (and lis poststructuralist allies) with what lie
cails the project ofdehellenization, an attack on the values of clarity, transparency, and intellectual
rnastery that are so deeply irnbedded within Western consciousness (774).
Chapter 3
Ontological Hermeneutics and Levitical Judaism
Introduction
In its broadest sense, “hermeneutics” means “the science of interpretation.” This science
bas, of course, been with us for a very long time. As Robert flolub points out, the
etymology of “hermeneutics” recalls Hermes, Greek mythology’ s wing-footed
messenger ofthe gods (255). Much later, during the Restoration, hermeneutics came to
be associated with the enterprise of biblical exegesis. Then, thanks to the works of
Protestant theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher and philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey,
hermeneutics’ scope was expanded. Its focus became understanding in general,
including those approaches to it found within the human sciences and humanities. Afier
this transformation, stiil another one, this time ted by the philosophers Martin Heidegger
and, following him, Hans-Georg Gadamer, inaugurated the era of post-romantic or
“ontological hermeneutics.” That is the form of it that I shail be focusing on in this
chapter.1
The chapter’s central argument — indeed that of the thesis as a whole — is that this
hermeneutics ought to be distinguished from the approaches to exegesis that are at home
in the theoretical, metaphysical tradition as well as from those of their poststructuralist
opponents. To support this here, I shah develop an account ofthis hermeneutics’
fundamental characteristics, one that contrasts them with both the metaphysical and
poststructuralist approaches. I shah then describe the affinities between hermeneutics
and the “dialogical” philosophy ofMartin Buber. The latter’s thought, moreover, will be
for an account ofthe history ofhermeneutics, see Gerald Bruns’ Hermeneutics Ancient andModern.
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shown to have roots in a particular form of ancient Judaism: flot the rabbinic Judaisrn
that is the source ofpoststructuralism but an alternative ‘1evitical” Judaisrn.
The chapter consists of two sections. The first contains a two-part account of the
hermeneutical enterprise. first, I shaH examine the particular conception of linguistic
meaning assumed by hermeneutics, i.e., that language is, at base. meaningful in a
‘symbolic” rather than semiotic way. As I will show, different conceptions ofmeaning
are associated with different conceptions of interpretation: for the hermeneuticist (unlike
the metaphysician or poststructuralist) we ought to affirm a methodological distinction
between the kind of interpretation appropriate to the humanities and human sciences on
the one hand and that relevant to the natural sciences on the other. Then, in the second
part, I shall explore the particular way in which hermeneutics accounts for the
relationship between subject and object or the self and the other and follow this with a
brief demonstration of its implications for interpretive practice. finally, in the chapter’ s
next section, I shall suggest that there is a connection between hermeneutics, Buber’s
dialogical philosophy, and levitical Judaism.
Section I — Ontological Herrneneutics
Part (i) — Linguistic Meaning: Symbolic Expressivism vs. Semiotic Representationalisrn
In chapter I, I described poststructuralism’ s conception of language as fundamentally
semiotic. Meaning, according to this view, is at base designative: signs consist of
signifiers that sign/j’ signifieds, i.e., they point towards them. for example, by seeing a
friend’s bicycle in front ofhis hotise (the signifier), one apprehends that he is at home
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(the meaning signified). The sign thus points to a meaning that is situated elsewhere,2
the connection established between the signifier and signified being uitimately
considered a matter of arbitrary convention. Yet whereas structuraiist linguistics
assumes that signs are commensurable and hence that it is possible to constnict a
representation of the whoie system of a given ianguage’s signs. the poststructuraiist
denies this. To the poststructuralist, there wiil aiways be some differed meaning in any
signifying process; no totalizing representation of the whole can ever be possible.
In hermeneutics, by contrast, meaning is, at base, a matter ofthe expression of
symbols rather than the designation of signs. Whereas semioticians emphasize the
potential independence of distinct signifiers and signifieds, hermeneuticists assert
instead the consubstantiaiity of the symbolizing and the symbolized. The idea here is
that what is expressed (i.e., the symbolized) is integrated with how it is expressed (i.e.,
the symbolizing) — meaning, that is, is aiways “right there” since it is tied to a particular
symbolic embodiment. For example, seeing a smiling, happy face aiiows one to
apprehend the particular way in which ail the features ofthat face corne together to
rnanifest, to rnake present, a particular meaning: that the person whose face it is is
happy. The meaning, then, arises flot from some pointing away but from “within” the
symboi. Hence Coleridge, who can be read as affirming this symbolic connection
between form and content when he writes: “such as the life is, such is the form” (46).
Adopting this principie for its conception of the fundamental basis of meaning,
2 Other examples of designative meaning can be found in Taylor’s “Language and Hurnan Nature” (2 1$-
19).
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hermeneutics can thus be said to reject the separation between signifier and signified
that is assumed by semiotics, whether stnicturalist or poststructuralist.3
That linguistic meaning is ultimately a matter of symbolic expressivism is
sornething that, as the citation from Coleridge indicates, contemporary hermeneuticists
inherited from their romantic forbearers. Yet there is a fundamental difference between
the romantic and the post-romantic hermeneuticists, one that tends to be overlooked by
poststructuralists. The latter tend to lump both romantic and ontological hermeneutics
together and thus make the mistake of assuming that the latter is as much a part of the
metaphysical tradition as the former.
We can avoid this mistake by exarnining the nature ofthe symbol. In his
Theories ofihe Symbot, Tzvetan Todorov describes how the romantics inaugurated their
conception ofthe symbol by contrasting it with allegory. According to the romantics,
symbol and allegory differ in at least five respects. f irst, as we have already noted, both
diverge as regards the locus of meaning production. Allegory is said to produce its
meanings through designation, by atiuding to a narrative or other art form that is
external to it; as such, it is like the sign in which the signifier and signified are, as we
have noted, separate. Allegorical meaning, then, can be accessed by employing the
rational intellect in order to make the necessary connection (Todorov 201, 203). The
apprehension ofa symbol’s meaning, however, requires not only intellection but also
perception, for one must actually see the symbol if its meaning is to be manifest. As
Charles Taylor puts it in his “Language and Human Nature”: “what expression manifests
can onÏy be rnanifested in expression” (219).
Taylor explores the contrast between these two modes of linguistic meaning in his “Langtiage and
Human Nature,” “Theories ofMeaning,” and “The Importance ofHerder.”
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Note that the romantic perceiver of the symbol is said to irnmediately
comprehend two levels ofrneanings: the particular, that which is manifested by the
symbol in itself, e.g., the happiness ofthe person whose face it is, and the general, in
this case, happiness in general. The combining ofthis duality within immediate
comprehension is said to be something surprising to the interpreter. With the allegory,
by contrast, its meaning is assumed to be strictly functional or utilitarian: it exists as a
particular and yet only as an example ofthe general, i.e., it is meant to serve as simpty
an instrument through which one can perceive the general. This suggests a second
difference between symbol and allegory: the symbol is a self-contained entity, the
product of a “synthesis” or “fusion” of symbolizer and symbolized, particular and
general, while the allegory, in keeping with the separation of signifier and signified,
entails a signified meaning that, ultimately, points to some independent and abstract
universal (Todorov 201, 203).
The third difference bas to do with the purpose of interpretation. To tbe
rornantic, the interpretation of allegory bas a transparent end. For once the connection
witb whatever bas been allegorized has been made, the meaning in question bas been
fully grasped. Not SO when it cornes to the perceiver of tbe symbol, who the romantic
conceives as receiving a kind of invitation from it, an invitation to an unending task of
symbolic interpretation. Ibis is because the parts ofa symbolic whole are understood to
combine in such a way as to provide an inexhaustible source of meaning, this being a
function of their abiÏity to “express the inexpressible.” To the romantics, then, whereas
the meaning ofthe allegory is something already made, already defined, and hence
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finite, complete, even “dead,” that ofthe symbol is infinite and “lives” forever (Todorov
206).
The fourth difference arises from how meaning is constituted: with the symbol,
meaning is produced by the particular “organic” way in which ail of its features
combine. for example, ail parts ofthe face must work together in a particular way to
manifest the particular happiness. With the allegory, by contrast, the possibiilty that one
can invoke a number of very different — indeed separate — designations to communicate
the same meaning means that there is no need to invoke an organic unity (Todorov 206).
This points us towards the fifth difference: intransitivity. The bicycle locked
outside someone’s house signifies that its owner is probabÏy home. But since some other
signifier could have equally donc the work, e.g., the light on in the window of her room,
the assumption is that ail ofthe different potential signifiers are transitive. Allegorical
meaning is considered similarly transitive, since in allegory the whole point is that
another story, or more than one, is equally capable of conveying the very sarne meaning.
With the symbol, however, the “fusion” of symbolizer and symbolized entails that only
thatparlicttÏar symbol can convey thatparticuÏar meaning; no other smiling face, for
example, could express happiness in exactly the same way (Todorov 203).
Although they championed the symbol, this does not mean that the romantics
rejected allegory altogether. As Todorov points out, some granted il a secondary role
(201). Precisely this binary opposition, however, has led Paul de Man, one ofthe leading
poststructurailst thinkers, to raise an objection. In his “Rhetoric ofTemporality,” de
Man criticizes the assumption that the symbol, in contrast with the allegory, is the
predominant characteristic ofromantic diction. The notion, he daims, is a “self-
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mystification,” a veil thrown “over a light one no longer wishes to perceive” (208).
Against the grain, de Man daims that not only did allegory still prevail (at least in early)
rornanticism but that, in fact, the allegorical mode expresses the genuine rornantic voice,
one that asstimes that there is aiways distance between self (subject) and non-self
(object). Tndeed, de Man’s radical rethinking ofromantic rhetoric leads him to daim that
the very assumption of rornantic substitution of the symbol for the allegory reveals a
totalizing desire (188), one that constitutes an act ofontological bad faith (211).
As noted above, the romantic assumption of organic unity in expression assumes
that there is a total fusion between the symbolizing and the symbolized or form and
content. This unification implies that the symbol does not depend on things outside ofit,
i.e., on the context. for its meaning. As such, it allows the romantic to daim that given
symbols are rneaningfully self-sufficient, which is to say meaningful in both an
autonomous and universal way. Given this, I think de Man is correct when he complains
that there is sornething totalizing and hence dogmatic about the romantic symbol. More
specifically, as he points out, the organically unified symbol does not allow for the
intervention oftime and context, which is to say, for historical tempora]ity (207). This,
again, is a resuit of its self-enclosed nature. In consequence, de Man prefers the allegory
since he believes that time is its ftindamental constitutive category (207). We can see
why by recognizing how the separation between the signifier and the signified entails a
distance, one that allows the linguistic sign to support an allegory that works through
repetition and iteration. As de Man explains,
We have. . . [in the world ofallegoryj a relationship between signs in
which the reference to their respective meanings has becorne of
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secondary importance. But this relationship between signs necessarily
contains a constitutive temporal element; it remains necessary, if there is
to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refers to another sign that precedes
it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist only
in the repetition . of a previous sign with which it can neyer coincide,
since it is ofthc essence ofthis previous sign to be pure anteriority.
Whereas the symbol postulates the possibility of an identity or
identification, allegory designates prirnarily a distance in relation to its
own origin, and, renouncing the nostalgia and the desire to coincide, it
establishes its language in the void ofthis temporal difference. In so
doing it prevents the self from an illusory identification with the non-self,
which is now fully, though painfully, recognized as a non-self (ernphasis
added 207).
The allegorical sign can represent meaning, then, only because it is amenable to iteration
over time. Yet this does not happen, as structuralist sernioticians assume, within a
systematic unity. for to de Man, as we have seen, meaning is established “in the void”
of the temporal differences between the signifier and the signified; if there to be
1-neaning, that is, the system must, in a sense, be “cracked.” De Man, then, rejects botÏi
systematic and organic unity, both structuralist semiotics and romantic expressivism.
As I said, de Man seems to be correct in his daim that there is something
totalizing about affirming the symbol as a self-enclosed autonomous entity. But bis own
total rejection of symbolic expressivism is simply too-quick. I believe that there is a
form of it that should not be identified with the metaphysical tradition. It departs from
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the romantic notion that interpretation is an act of alrnost mystical empathy, in which
one ‘jumps” out ofone’s self “into the shoes” ofthe object ofinterpretation or those of
its creator. To the rornantic, the point is to reconstruct or recreate the moment in which,
driven by an author’s intention, the meaning ofa symbol manifests itself in the fusion
between symbolizing and symbolized (Weinsheimer, Gadarner ‘s Hermeneutics 131 )4
Yet there is another symbolic alternative.
It is the one defended by the post-romantic herrneneuticist. While stili asserting
the centrality of symbolic expressivism, he or she nevertheless does flot conceive of the
symbol as a fully fused, totally consubstantial entity. To philosophers such as Heidegger
and Gadamer, interpretation is more a matter of re-articulation than reconstruction, and
symbolic meaning is considered sornething inherently contextual. They can daim this
because they assume that the symbolizer and the symbolized, though organically related,
are nevertheless not unified. To them, there is aiways room for the symbolized to be
expressed somewhat differently, i.e., by a different, though neyer wholly unrelated,
symbolizer.
De Man hirnself appears to recognize something of the distinction between the
two forms ofhermeneutics when he writes ofhow Gadamer’s understanding of
symbolism can “no longer [be] seen as a configuration of entities that designate a
plurality of distinct and isolated meanings [i.e., ofself-enclosed symbols], but a
1 As Gadarner puts it, for Schleiermacher, for example, interpretation is “ultimately a divinatory
procedure, a placing oneseif inside the whole outlook ofthe author, a comprehension ofthe ‘inner
immergence’ ofthe composition ofa work, a recreation ofthe creative act” (Truth 164). In sum, as
Weinsheirner indicates, interpretation for the romantic hermeneuticist consists ofa “psychological
reconstruction ofthe genius ofthe author,” wherein the interpreter transposes himselfinto the author’s
horizon (Gada,ner’s Hermeneutics 141). E. D. Hirsch’s hermeneutics, which emphasizes the importance
ofcapturing the author’s intention, can thus be considered a part ofthe Rornantic hermeneutical tradition.
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configuration of symbols ultimately leading to a total, single, and universal meaning”
(18$). Yet, as the reference to total universal meaning indicates, de Man stili
misconceives Gadamer’s alternative. for one thing, he misses Gadamer’s own rejection
ofromantic symbolism’s totalizing tendencies (Weinsheirner, Gadczmer ‘s Herinenetttics
131). for another, he fails to appreciate the inherently contextual, hence historical,
nature of post-rornantic hermeneutics. This is because Gadamer’s hermeneutics assumes
that, since the fusion ofthe symbolizing and symbolized is neyer complete (there being
other symbols that could articulate similar meanings), context necessarily entcrs into the
constitution of symbolic meaning. Given this, we need to recognize how that meaning
evolves in history.
Meaning as so understood makes way, as we have noted, for a different
conception of its interpretation. Rather than reconstruction, the point now is re
articulation. Rather than intuiting meaning in the blink of one’s “mind’s eye,” one
engages in a kind of conversation with the object of interpretation, an ongoing dialogical
process. There can be no “jumping out of’ one’s self since that self is one ofthe
interlocutors necessary for the dialogue; it is what brings the ‘enabIing prejudices,” to
use Gadamer’s expression, necessary for meaning to show up in the first place.
That this is itself a ftindamentally temporal process should be evident. Unlike
poststructuralist ternporality, however, time is not a matter ofthe iteration ofdiscrete
moments. On the contrary, it is conceived as an organically continuous flow, in which
the past ftows into the present and the present into future. This is tirne as Henri Bergson
famously conceived ofit, what he called “durée.”5
As Rergson defines this notion oftime:
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Interpretation as re-articulation, however, is relevant only when it cornes to
symbolic meaning. As we have noted, the expressivist tradition, whether in its romantic
or post-rornantic forms, asserts the centraiity or fundamentality ofthe symbol but not its
exclusivity. Language can indeed also designate meaning, and when it does so another
kind of interpretation is required (Taylor, “Importance” 86-87). Hence the
methodologicat distinction that ah expressivists assert between the human sciences and
humanities on the one hand and the natural sciences on the other. The former are those
disciplines that aim to understand texts or text-analogues (the latter being the personal
and social practices that are the subjects ofthe human sciences) that are, for the most
part, expressed syrnbolically rather than designated. The latter studies things as they
exist in nature, governed by culturally independent and universal physical laws.
This suggests that, for the ontologicai hermeneuticist, when humans designate,
they may be understood to communicate as animais do. The assurnption here is that
animals do not have language in its fullest sense, that their means of communication is
different and that this difference is, as Taylor has argued, not only a question of degree
of sophistication.
To Taylor, chimpanzees, for exarnple, are certainly capable of learning to
correlate between signs, say between a goal representable as “want banana” and the task
required to achieve it. To learn to use the representation in question is “to learn to apply
it appropriateiy in the furtherance of some non-linguisticaiiy-defined purpose or task”
Pure duration is the form which the succession ofour conscious states assumes when
our ego lets itself hue, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former
states. For this purpose it need flot be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea;
for then, on the contrary, it would no longer endure. Nor need it forget its former states:
it is enough that, in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside another, but
forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we
recali the note ofa tune, melting, so to speak, into one another. (99)
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(“Importance” $4). By “non-linguisticaiiy-defined” Taylor means to invoke something
that could be sufficientiy defined otherwise, for exampie, by the representation of a
series of instrumental steps. In non-linguistic definitions, there is no intrinsically right
representation since other representations may be equally adequate to the task. Not so
when it cornes to expressive language, as when one reaches for a particular metaphor to
convey a particular emotion: here there is indeed a strict sense ofwhat is required to
“get it right.” Uniike with the instrumental signais used by animais, then, expressive
rightness cannot be explained in terms of success at a task that is flot itself linguistically
deftned (Taylor, “Importance” $4). The abiiity to use expressive terms correctly is thtis
soniething that relies on those tenus being situated in what Taylor calis the Ïinguistic
dimension,” a place to which animais simply do flot have access. As he puts it, animais
are sirnply incapable ofusing and responding to words “in terms oftheir truth, or
descriptive rightness, or power to evoke some rnood, or recreate a scene, or express
some ernotion, or carry some nuance of feeling, or in sorne such way to be le motjuste”
(“Importance” $4).
Consider how, when we converse, even about factuai matters, we estabiish a
particular stance as a resuit ofthe way we stand and speak. for example, we forrn an
objective stance when we coidiy examine something, and this is expressed by our style of
speech, by the words we use, and by the particular way in which our aioof air manages to
hoid our interiocutor at a certain distance. However unconscious we may be ofwhat we are
doing, TayÏor suggests, we nutst stili be sensitive to the rightness ofthis mien as expressing
a particular stance (“Importance” $6-$7). This is very different from how, for exampie,
one’s facial twitches might show one to be agitated, as they do so by signaling or
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designating rather than expressing the condition. The symptoms of any physiologicai
condition are, in consequence, serniotic rather than symbolic.
Indeed, even when humans use words only to designate meaning, it is stiil
possible to enquire about the intention expressed by the signal. As Taylor points out, for
example, there is an expressive difference between saying “Watch out for the buil!” or
just “Tiger!” Yet there is no sense to posing a question about underlying expressive
meaning when it cornes to the signais that can be used to communicate with animais.
There is no point, for example, in asking whether a red triangle means “fun here” or
“cheese” or “fun here for cheese” and so on to a rat, just as there is nothing gained by
distinguishing between two possible meanings ofa bird’s cry, say “danger” or
“skedaddle.” Meaning in these exampies can only refer to the response aroused rather
than to anything that, again, is intrinsically iinguistic. Not so when it cornes to the gamut
of iiiocutionary forces present in a human’ s iinguistic repertoire (Taylor, “Importance”
$7).
Those who take metaphysical or poststrncturatist approaches, however, do flot
make this strong distinction between the expressivist, strictly human use of language on
the one hand and the non-human use of it on the other. for their assumption that
language is at base serniotic recognizes only the designative conception of meaning.
Rence the absence in their thinking ofthe methodological distinction between the
human and natural sciences, a distinction, again, that is centrai to herrneneutics.
Affirming it, as T shah show below, has major implications for how one ought to
conceive of textual interpretation.
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f irst, however, I wish the reader to recali that, whereas the metaphysician
assumes that reason can employ language, i.e., signs, to capture meaning, the
poststructuralist rejects this project as unfeasible. for the latter language is flot merely
an instrument of reason, and meaning cannot simply be “captured” by it since meaning
is endlessly differed. The science or knowledge aimed for by the metaphysician is thus
considered unattainable. And yet the poststructuralists can be said to echo the
metaphysicians in their daim that their beliefs apply equally across ail ofthe sciences,
both human and natural.
To the herrneneuticist, however, it is because some meanings, being
symboÏicaÏly based, are historically and cuÏturatly relative whiÏe others, being semiotic,
are flot (or at least not necessarily) that two distinct forrns of reasoning about them are
required: the interpretation of the former relies upon a “warm” engaged reason that is
unlike the cold disengaged reason essential to the natural scientist (Blattberg, PÏziralist
20-2 1). This engaged reason, as Gadarner, in particular, emphasizes, shares something
ofthe spirit ofAristotle’s notion ofpractical reason orphronesis, a forrn ofjudgrnent
that aims for a kind ofobjectivity that is engaged with rather than disengaged from the
context. Aristotelian phronesis is, in consequence, central to his account of
interpretation (Truth 19, 314, 3 16-17, 322). Tt allows him to daim that interpretation is
indeed a rational affair and hence that there are better or worse interpretations — a resuit
ofthe degree to which they are true to what they are about. Moreover, in making
practical, rather than theoretical, reason the more basic, hermeneuticists such as
Gadamer may be said to have extricated thernselves from the metaphysical tradition. for
whereas the metaphysician, as we have seen, conceives of logos as more a matter of
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thought than of language, the hermeneuticist does not distinguish between the two ternis
at ail.
It is important to note that this methodological distinction does flot rely upon a
naïve, positivist conception of natural science, one which assumes that research
techniques, indeed the very questions the researcher asks, are somehow culture-free.
Nevertheless, as Blattberg argues (Plurctflst 14-25), post-positivist or post-empiricist
conceptions ofnatural science, advanced by such thinkers as Karl Popper and Willard
Quine, stili assume that research is about phenomena that are meaningful in a semiotic
way. Ironically enough, this is a position they share with their difference-inspired
opponents in the philosophy of science, thinkers such as Richard Rorty and Mary Hesse.
Hermeneuticists sucli as Taylor (“Understanding Human” 25-3 8 ) and Hubert L.
Dreyfus (Why” 3-22), however, have contributed to the establishment of a third way,
the only one that distinguishes the work ofthe scholars ofhuman science and the
humanities from those ofthe natural sciences. It is as a result ofhis fallure to follow
Taylor and Dreyfus that the literary theorist Joel Weinsheimer, in his Gadamer ‘s
Hermeneuties. assumes that the move to post-empiricist philosophies of natural science
have “rendered inconsequential one aspect of the critical thrust of Truth and Method —
its attempt to legitimize an avenue to truth that lies outside and in opposition to the
methodological control ofthe natural sciences” (64; see also 16-36, 41, 43, 49-53).
Weinsheimer even goes so far as to echo the hermeneutics of suspicion” of the
poststructuralists when he daims that in “both the natural and human sciences, the process
ofunderstanding is the process of disillusionrnent” (Gadamer ‘s Hermeneutics 24). But the
methodological distinction in question rests upon more than the differentiation of
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‘application in the historical sciences from the subsumption under laws that is typical of
application in the natural sciences” (Gadamer ‘s Herrneneutics 35); it has to do with the
very nature of the meaning one is trying to interpret. Weinsheimer, however, misses
precisely this.
Part (ii) — Self and Other
Corresponding to the above differences between metaphysics, poststructuralism and
hermeneutics is an episternological one concerned with the conceptions of and the
relations between subject and object or self and other. In short, whereas the modem
metaphysician subscribes to a dualist epistemology in which subject and object are
independent of each other, and whereas the poststructuralist critiques this dualism in an
albeit complicit way, the hermeneuticist rejects, or rather subordinates, the dualisrn
altogether. To the hermeneuticist, subject and object always begin as parts ofa greater
whole.
Systernatic theory, as I mentioned in the Introduction, can be associated with the
rnetaphysics of Cartesian dualism. It assumes a separation between a reflective “I” that
struggies for mastery or control over a “non-I” or object. Poststructuralisrn, as we have
seen, rejects this aim and its associated division between subject and object. To the
poststructuralist, any ‘capturing” ofthe object by a subject necessitates the reduction of
the former’s “otherness” to the “same” ofthe subject. As Colin Davis has put it, the
other gets acknowledged “only in order to be suppressed or possessed; as in the worldngs of
the Hegelian dialectic, the characteristic gesture of [metaphysical] philosophy is to
acknowledge the Other in order to incorporate it within the expanding circles ofthe same”
70
(40). Appreciating this means appreciating that the world can neyer be cornpletely known,
that it contains fissures or cracks — hence aporias — before which reason is helpless.
At the heart of this philosophy lies, as we have seen, a paradoxical movement of
subversion and re-inscription, one in which the relation between self and other striven for by
the metaphysician is reversed. The asymrnetry between the two is thus maintained but
turned upside-down: now the other is understood to have power over ffie self— at least in
those “blinldng” moments ofblindness present within all insight. These are the times when
the other, flot the self, is doing the looking (Blattberg, ‘Loving Wisdom” 17). Thus, as
Levinas puts this, “t]here is a comrnandment in the appearance ofthe face [ofthe other], as
if a master spoke to me,” for “since the Other looks at me, I am responsible for him, without
even having tctken on responsibilities in his regard; his responsibility is incwnbent on me”
(Ethics $9, 96).6
Gadarner’s hermeneutics should also be interpreted as rejecting Cartesian dualism.
As Alasdair Maclntyre bas described, “Gadarner is involved in an argument against a
view of aesthetic experience which has hunted us for nearly two hundred years: the
isolated self reading the isolated text” (43). Or as Weinsheirner lias put it, to Gadamer
“[b]oth subject and object are derivative and secondary, in that both precipitate out of
the more primordial unity of being at home in the world. Further, both are determined
negatively: the knowing subject no longer understands, and the object to be known no
longer fits” (Gadamer ‘s Hermeneutics 5). In this, Gadarner follows Heidegger’s daim that
anything meaningftil — including the distinction between seLf and other — necessarily
emerges out of a pre-reflective background, one to which all meaningful things remain
6 Or, as Levinas writes in Totality andlnflnlly : “Goodness consists in taking up a position such that
the other counts more than myself’ (247).
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somewhat attached. Thinking, the point of departure for the metaphysical tradition, is
thus secondary to Being: as Kierkegaard once put it, we should say “J am therefore T
think” rather than Descartes’ ‘I think therefore I am” (qtd in Dreyftis 3). This implies
that our primordial mode ofbeing is that of participation in the flow ofpre-reftective
practice, in what Heidegger lias called “average everydayness” (Being and Time 67-71,
421-23). Reflection, then, can begin only a/ler something lias “shown up” out of the pre
reflective background. The metaphysician misses precisely this, however. as Heidegger
suggests in his “Letter on Humanism” when he compares the rnetaphysician’s obsession
with thought to “the procedure of trying to evaluate the nature and powers of a fish by
seeing how long it can live on dry land. For a long tirne now,” Heidegger continues,
“thinking has been stranded on dry land” (195).
Ah this has implications for how we should conceive of interpretation. for one
thing, it implies that interpretation, at Ieast when it is engaged, is also aiways self
interpretation. This is because the other, given its owu connection to the background, is
aiways also partly integrated with the self As Paul Ricoeur puts it,
[t]he subject that interprets himselfwhule interpreting signs is no longer
the cogito: rather, he is a being who discovers, by the exegesis of bis own
hife, that he is placed in being before he places and possesses himself. In
this way, hermeneutics would discover a manner of existing which would
remain from start to finish a being-interpreted.” (11)
So unhike with either theoretical rnetaphysics or its poststructuralist alternative, the
assumption is that there is always some mutuality between self and other, a result of
their both sharing a pre-reflective background. Moreover, the relation between tliern is
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fundamentally symmetrical, the symmetry characteristic ofthe genuine back-and-forth
necessary for any real dialogue. This means thatjust as the metaphysician’s reduction of
the other to the same is shuimed — for dialogue requires an openness of self that is
incompatible with reductiveness — so too is the difference phulosopher’s belief that the
other is necessarily aiways an “absolute Other,” one that is in principle beyond
comprehension. The other, then, does not aiways have a power over the self; sometimes,
at least, the two can be reconciled.
Indeed reconciliation is the point ofhermeneutical dialogue. The aim is to
convert an initial state of misunderstanding into one of understanding, of even greater
sharing. That is why Gadamer teils us that “[t]o find one’s own in the alien, to become
at home in it, is the fundamental movernent of spirit, whose being is only return to itself
from being otherwise” (Truth 15); or, as Ricoeur has put it, “[i]t is thus the growth of
[the interpreter’sl own understanding of himselfthat he pursues through his
understanding ofthe other. Every hermeneutics is thus, explicitly or implicitly, self
understanding by means ofunderstanding others” (17). The event ofinterpretation, in
consequence, is necessarily ontological (hence “ontoÏogicaÏ hermeneutics”) for it has an
impact on the world, whether that part of it which is the identity of the interpreter, or the
object interpreted, or both. So when Gadamer writes that “[a]ll understanding is
ultimately self-understanding,” for “[in] every case the fact is that whoever understands
understands hirnself, projects himself on his own possibilities” (Truth 231), we can see
how hermeneutical interpretation has the potential to change the interpreter. An
interpretation is neyer the “possession” of some consciousness since interpreting
-1-,
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subjects do flot stand aloofand objective, as the metaphysician assumes; rather, what
they interpret is itselfpartly constituted by their own horizon, their “selves.”
The point here, again, is flot reductiveness towards either the self or the other,
but a reconciling, a coming together that is represented by an understanding shared by
both self and other. “This between,” Gadarner writes, “is the true locus ofhermeneutics”
(Truth 263).
0f course, to the philosopher of difference, this hermeneutical mutuality
constitutes but another form ofthe metaphysician’s reduction ofthe other to the sarne.
As I have tried to show, however, it is anything but. Consider Weinsheirner’s contrast of
Gadamer’s approach with the totalizing ofHegel’s dialectic:
Gadamer departs from Hegel in that he envisions no end point where the
movement of alienation and return can cease in a total self-appropriation.
For Gadamer the spirit is at home only elsewhere; and though this does
not mean that it is a horneless vagabond, nevertheless the spirit remains
perpetually on the way home: it exists as a movement toward being more
fully what it is. (Gadamer ‘s Hermenettflcs 71)
Thus is the hermeneuticist always “on the way.”7 One neyer completes one’s
understanding of a text, neyer truly “captures” it; on the contrary, the process of learning
from it, and so of changing oneseif on the basis of what one learns, is endless. No
reconciliation is ever final.
I now want to describe the implications ofthis hermeneutical conception of
interpretation for textual exegesis. To begin, note how aspects of a text “show up” to us
as in need of interpretation only when there is a conflict, which is to say when
As in the titie ofHeidegger’s On tue WaytoLanguage.
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sornething in the text appears to us as confusing or contradictory. In airning to
rearticulate what has shown up, the hermeneutical interpreter aims to transform it so that
the features in conflict can be reconciled and hence “make sense.” Thus is understanding
achieved, an understanding that, as we have seen, requires change, whether ofthe text,
or of its interpreter, or both. Only then does the problem that initially confronted the
interpreter fade back into the pre-reflective background, making way for sornething else
to emerge and hold his or her attention.
Moreover, ‘what” is interpreted in this process is not some fixed, independent
meaning, comparable, as the New Critics would have it, with the “words on the page.”
Rather, the conscious. intellectual sort of interpretation that drives re-articulation is itself
preceded by what we might identify as a passive, unconscious interpretive act. That is
when the “horizon” of the self is fused with that of the text on the page (as in Gadamer’ s
farnous expression about the “fusion of horizons”), this constituting the meaning to be
interpreted in the more explicit or conscious sense. On their own, self and text are
“meaningless,” at least in an expressivist sense. That is why Gadamer would have us
reject the conception ofthe artwork as an object presented to a conscious subject, in
which the latter interprets the former from some external standpoint (Weinsheimer,
Gadamer ‘s Hermeneutics 11 8). Since when Gadamer writes that “production is in truth
the original mode ofbeing of ail transitory arts” (Truth 143), he means that it makes no
sense to speak of an original work in any primordial sense. This is because a work only
exists as meaningful during the fusion of horizons and this, given the constant change of
contexts, is going to be somewhat different each and every time. for the very same
reason, Gadamer rejects the notion of art as mimesis, since no artwork can represent
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sornething that exists in itself outside ofits perception by the artist. Production, in
consequence, is aiways considered a kind of reproduction, as with Gadamer’ s daim that
“it is first through the picture that the original becomes original” (Truth 125). Like the
poststructuralist, then, the hermeneuticist wouid collapse the separation between a work
and what it represents (Weinsheirner, Gadamer ‘s Hermeneutics 120-25, 129-30), there
being no “original,” in a primordial sense. for the same reason that, as Derrida once put
it, ail words act as a “supplement.”
So at least when it cornes to texts or text-anaiogues that are rneaningfui in an
expressive sense, we can see why, to the Gadamerian, it is impossible to step outside of
the interpreted world and developing neutrai or literal readings. There is no such thing
as literai expressive meaning, just as there can be no final authoritative interpretation,
say, one that captures an author’ s intention. For the latter is itself but an interpretation,
something always “on the way.” Otherwise put, even creation aiways contains some
interpretafion in it (humans, afier ail, neyer create ex nihilo).
None ofthis rneans that there is anything wrong with speaking of “truth” when it
cornes to interpretation. The truth that corresponds to some external object, the truth of
the modem episternoiogist. certainiy has its place, but oniy, as we have seen, in the
natural sciences. The interpretation of expressive, symbolic meaning requires a different
understanding oftruth, one that is inherently contextual. This is a matter ofbeing true to
meaning as it appears to given interpreters in a given interpretive situation. Not that this
should be considered subjectivist. Indeed, there are at least two reasons why P. D. Juhi,
for one, is wrong to daim that “it follows [from Gadamer’s herrneneutics] that a
statement about the meaning ofa work is a statement about a particular critic’s
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subjective understanding” (Inteipretation 8). f irst, because the meaning the interpreter
strives to be faithful to is flot simply his or her’s alone; as we have noted, it is
constituted by the fusion of his or her horizon with that of the text or text-analogue.
Face Rainer Warning, among others (Weinsheimer, Gadamer ‘s Herrnenet,tics 128),
Gadamer’s herrneneutics is thus not at ail comparable to reception theory. This is most
evident when the reception theorist Hans Robert Jauss argues against Gadarner’s
contention that the artwork first speaks to us before we interrogate it, i.e., that we
interpret it pre-reflectively before we ever interpret it consciousïy or expiicitly (Jauss
30). To Jauss, for whorn meaning is only constituted by the reader, we might say that a
text cannot “speak” before an interpreter lias made it do so. To the lierrneneuticist, as we
have seen. this is two-sided: neither the text nor the reader is sovereign over meaning;
both. together, must constitute it.
The second reason this herrneneutics is not subjectivist is associated with the fact
that one’s own horizon is not whoiiy one’s own. for it is aiways partly shared with
others, those ofthe linguistic community within which one has been brought up and
shares certain traditions. As Gadarner writes: “[uJnderstanding itself is not to be
considered as an act ofsubjectivity but asjoining in with an event of tradition in which
past and present are constantly rnediated” (Trztth 258). The subject’s self, then, neyer
exists in isolation, as if like some independent atom.8 Indeed that is why two or more
subjects are able to converse about the “sarne” text in the first place, since the meaning
that shows up to each of them aiways bas some aspects in common. Otlierwise their
coming to agreement, not to mention their initial disagreement, would neyer be possible.
8 Thus does Heidegger, in his “Letter on Hurnanism,” reject essentialist or existential conceptions of
hurnan being, those that offer ahistorical answers to the question “What is the essence ofrnan?” (204-10).
On the problems with affirming such atornistic social ontologies, see Taylor’s “Atomism.”
77
Yet the dialogue, the exchange of interpretations, recommended by the
hermeneuticist as the best way for reaching understanding should flot be conceived, as
Stanley Fish does conceive of it, as restricted to a given “interpretive cornmunity.” b
fish, ‘[y]ou will agree with me (that is, understand), only if you already agree with me”
(173). But the very reason for entering into dialogue is that something has shown up to
potential interlocutors, something that, as we have seen, is expressive of a conflict, a
disagreernent (otherwise it would have remained invisible, part of their shared pre
reflective background). This suggests that the borders of a community, of a given set of
shared understandings, are flot only porous but also often themselves in question. When
people disagree, that is, there is a sense in which their community itself is the subject of
that disagreernent. The common good that constitutes a cornmunity, in consequence,
neyer represent a consensus — or, rather, even if it does, we must speak of a consensus
around a set of interpretations that are neyer final and thus aiways open to question. The
comrnunity ofinterlocutors is thus, again, always “on the way.” Weinsheirner, then, is
right to point out that Fish’s conception ofcommunity leaves no room for genuine
conflict, hence for the attempt at reconciliation through the exchange of interpretations.
As he points out, in Fish’s world. “[tJhose within the community do not discuss. only
nod in recognition; and those outside ofthe cornmunity do not even share the same text
with those within, and hence have nothing in common to talk about” (“Suppose Theory
is Dead” 265).
It is because members of the same community share something, even if only
disagreements, in common that they are able to converse, to interpret together. Each
brings partly shared prejudices to bear on a given matter, constituting it in a certain way.
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That is why Gadamer bas &mously atempted w rehabilitate the concept ofprejudice,
especially as ng’inst what he bas œferred to as te Enlightenment’s “prejudice sgsint
prejudice” (Truth 239). To Gadamer, we ought w conceive ofprejudice as pie
judgment, i.e., as te bringing to bar ofone’s self; including te pre-refiecilve
background associated wit it, on a glven subject Otherwise put, prejudice refus to te
seWs horizon, a necessary halfofte fimction ifmesning is w b consdtuted in te first
place. Moreover, since ta self is at least paftly inheûted, we can see why prejudice
may b considered either a “gift” of fradifion or, oterwise, ta we always remain
somewhat “owned” by it M Gadamer wdtes:
[h]istoq does flot belong w us but instead we belong to iL Long befbre
we understand owselves reflectively, we undersand ourselves in a seff
evida way through tey, society, and state in which we live.
The self-consciousness ofte indMdual b only a ifickering in te close
circuits ofhistoûcal life. For this reason te prejudices ofte single
indMdual, far more than bis judgments, consfitute te histofical reality of
bis being. (ihul, 245)
0fcourse, te fact ta a given pre-judgment bas been handed down to us and b
essential to interpretaflon says noting about wheter it is right or wrong. To te
followers ofenlightenment, all prejudices are falsejust because tey are predetennined
by adition; hence teir cali for eliminsting all prejudices.
But this, as Gadamer points oi4 would b to cripple tradition (Truth 240) and
tus make interpretation — hence crifical judgment — impossible. h is only on te basis of
prejudices ta a given prejudice may b crificized, subjected to te sometimes radical
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transformations called for if there is to be understanding. Indeed, it is just because
sornething bas, thanks to the prejudices of interpreters, shown up as problematic that
interpretation is necessaiy in the first place. Understanding, then, can only corne with
transformation, which is why interpretation implies criticisrn. As Taylor puts it, for
instance, “understanding is inseparable from criticisrn” (“Understanding” 131). We
should thus disrniss the complaint of those, such as the philosopher Jtrgen Habermas,
that Gadamer’s herrneneutics is necessarily conservative.9 On the contrary, a conflict of
interpretations irnplies an opposition between different potentiai paths of transformation:
the reai question is “Which is the better way to go?” or, “Which interpretation makes the
rnost sense and hence would bring the most understanding?”° And these questions
mean: how shah we change?
This returns us to the centrality oftruth to hermeneutical interpretation. Face
Harold Bloom, for whorn ail readings are necessarily misreadings (3-6), or Culler, who
asserts that interpretation is a “necessary error” (Fitrsuit 14), the hcrmeneuticist assumes
that some interpretations are aiways better — more true — than others. for sorne are going
to be more faithful to the text as a whole.
To invoke the notion ofthe text as a whoÏe is to appeal to the principle ofthe
hermeneutical circle. Things show up, as we have seen, because they emerge out ofthe
pre-reflective background, the whole of which all aspects of a given text or text
analogue are a part. The movement ofhermeneutical interpretation, then, begins with
that whole and only then moves on to the part or parts that have shown up. It then
See Habermas’ “A Review ofGadamer’s Trzith andMethod.”
° Jean Grondin, following Schleiermacher, describes the hermeneutical endeavor as one which
consists ofa transformation of an initial state ofrnisunderstanding into an understanding (70).
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retums to the whole as the interpreter searches for the account that is the most true to it.
As Gadamer writes:
[ajnyone who wants to understand a text aiways performs an act of
projection. 11e projects in advance a sense ofthe whole as soon as an
initial sense appears. Likewise the initial sense appears only because one
is already reading with certain expectations of a definite meaning. In
working out such a fore-projection, which is of course continually
revised, consists the understanding of what is there. (Truth 236)
Unlike the fragmentation ernphasized by the poststructuralist, then, the herrneneuticist
endeavor is thoroughly holistic, both in the sense that it is supported by a conception of
the whole and because it aims to reconcile, to integrate, those parts that have shown up
in conflict. Yet this holism is far from the systematic holism ofthe modem
metaphysician; there is no reduction ofconflicting parts to some systernatically unifled
theory. As we have seen, understanding requires an openness to change, to transforming
one’s prejudices. That is the fore-projection, as Gadamer writes above, which must be
continually revisited, continualiy re-examined and if necessary revised if there is to be
understanding. This openness, moreover, takes the form of a “listening” that leads the
hermeneuticist to affirm the centrality ofthe aurai rather than the ocular. As Gadamer
has put it, “the prirnacy ofhearing is the basis ofthe hermeneutical phenomena” (Truth
420). In consequence, while the “eye” may be an apt metaphor for conveying the
metaphysician’s will to power, and its “blinking” for expressing the poststructuralist
double movernent of inscription and subversion, the herrneneuticist believes that, if
there is to be understanding, we must turn instead to the “ear” (Rtattberg, ‘Loving
Wisdom” 20).
Section II — Buber’s Dialogical Philosophy and Levitical Judaisrn
Martin Buber’s thinking underwent a major transformation when he rejected
rnysticism, the focus ofhis early work, in favor of what he cails ‘dialogical
philosophy.” Thîs change tends to be dated around 1923, the year he published his
rnost famous work, land Thou. In that text, as elsewhere, Buber substituted the rnystic’s
highÏy individualist approach with one that emphasizes interpersonal relations. The
struggle ofthe isolated visionary to transcend the world was thus replaced by dialogical
man, someone who is embedded within the context of a given social situation.
Buber’s dialogical approach shares fundamental affinities with Gadarner’s
hermeneutics; indeed, I would go so far as to identify Buber as a hermeneuticist himself
I shah support this in a way that parahlels rny account of hermeneutics above. Thus, this
section will consist oftwo parts. f irst, I shah show how Buber, who incidentally was a
student of Dilthey’s, conceives of linguistic meaning in expressivist rather than
designative terms and adopts the latter’s methodological distinction between the hurnan
and natural sciences. I shah then examine Buber’s dialogical philosophy more directly,
focusing, as with my account ofhermeneutics above, on its conception oftÏ;e proper
relation between self and other. My aim here will be to demonstrate how Buber, like
Heidegger and Gadarner, rejects the dualism of modem metaphysical episternology.
It is a common usage among Buber’s scholars to divide his life into two stages: his mystical period
and his dialogical one (e.g., Paul Mendes-Flohr’s from Mysticisni to Dialogue 93-126). Dan Avnon,
however, divides the dialogical period into two: dialogue between 1923 and 1938 and attentive silence
between 1938 and 1965 (19-49).
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Against it, Buber posits his dialogical philosophy ofthe I and ThoulYou.12 In 50 doing,
moreover, he also affirms symmetry between interlocutors. I shah then close this part
with a briefaccount ofthe ramifications ofBuber’s approach for reading texts, in
particular, the Bible, for Buber’s biblical readings arc a model ofhermeneutical
endeavor. Finally, following Blattberg, I will suggest that Buber’s approach has roots in
a “levitical” form of ancient Judaism. Given Buber’ s similarities with the other
hermeneuticists, this implies that herrneneutics is much older than most of its
proponents have appreciated.
Part (i) — Linguistic Meaning Revisited
Central to Buber’s land Thon is his distinction — declared right at the beginning ofthe
text — between two modes of relation: the 1-It and the I-You. Each ofthese two word
couplets (or “basic words” in Buber’s terminology) are meant to be read as one unit, as
articulating aspects of a single concept; each, he stresses, denotes a different quahity of
interpersonal space. As Buber writes:
[b]asic words do not state sornething that might exist outside them by
being spoken they establish a mode of existence. . . . The basic word I
You can only be spoken with one’s whole being. The basic word 1-It can
neyer be spoken with one’s who{e being. (land Thoit 53-54)
By “I-You” Buber means a quahity wherein self and other are features of a single
inclusive reahity. By “T-li,” however, he wishes to invoke a separation between the “I”
12 Walter Kaufinann, who did the second translation of t and Thou into English, translates the German
Du as “You” rather than, as with Ronald Gregor Smiths previous translation, “Thou” (Kaufiuiann 14-15).
I follow Kauftriann as t think his choice more faithfully expresses the mutuality ofthe “1-You” mode. I
shah explain why below.
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and the other, between the subject and the object. 1-It is thus exernpHfled by the
instrumental relation between two relatively independent entities, while I-You affirms
instead a shared relationship. Tndeed, as Buber emphasizes, the I-You is implicit in any
movement towards relation. It thus establishes in the interpersonal sphere a quality that
he refers to as “the Between” (land Thou 65-66; Avnon 39).
It is important to note that, as Walter Kaufman points out in one ofhis
annotations to I and Thou, the first edition of the book has the sentences quoted above
preceded by one that is absent in ah ofthe further editions. The sentence is as follows:
“Basic words do flot signiJj’ things but relations” (emphasis added 53). Now given that,
as Steven Kepnes asserts, Buber in J and Thon “makes the distinction between the ‘I
Thou’ and T-It’ relationships on the basis of language” (ix). I suggest that his decision
to change the text in this way - in particular, by dropping the reference to signifying -
indicates that he wishes to affirrn a symbolic or expressivist conception of meaning. As
we have seen, expressivism assumes that symbohizing, rather than signifying, is the
more fundamental, that the sign is necessarily derivative ofthe symbol. Buber, I behieve,
makes this very point when he daims that basic words do not state things that exist
“outside them,” i.e., they do flot designate some separate signified but rather manifest
meaning that is at Ieast partly expressive ofthe self doing the manifesting. Hence
Buber’s reference to the abihity of basic words to “estabÏish a mode of existence.” To
this we can add the point he makes in another book, Moses, where he daims that bibhical
“content” cannot be separated from its “form” (9). This imphies a consubstantiality of
meaning that, once again, is at home in the expressivist tradition.
$4
Expressivisrn, as we have seen, also goes with the assertion of a methodological
distinction between the natural sciences on the one hand and the humanities and human
sciences on the other. Here, as I hinted above, Dilthey’s influence on Buber is decisive.
As Maurice Friedman has expÏained, however, Buber also criticizes his predecessor’s
romantic herrneneutics, especially as regards what Dilthey has to say about how
researchers should precede in the human sciences. For Buber’s philosophy ofthe
interhuman, Friedman argues, led him “to a more dialogical understanding ofthe task of
philosophical anthropology. . . [an understanding that] goes beyond cultural [i.e.,
romantic] anthropology” (16).13 WhuÏe the latter, as we have seen, advocates a form of
understanding that requires reconstructing meaning through a kind of ernpathy with or
jumping into the shoes of’ the other, the object to be known, Buber shares with
herrneneuticists the idea that interpreting subjects necessarilyparticipate in what they
interpret, making themselves a part of what they seek to understand. For Buber, in
consequence, the detached observer’s place is, for the most part, in the natural sciences.
This methodological difference is also paralleled by Buber’s distinction between
“dialogue” and “dialectics,” each of which he considers a kind ofreasoning. As
friedman points out, “dialogue” denotes the niutual knowing ofthe I-You relationship
while ‘dialectics” invokes the subject-object dualism ofthe 1-It relation (1$). Buber
does flot wish completely to ban dialectics or technical reasoning from the human
sciences or humanities; the point is only that, because the most ftindamental questions in
these disciplines are about matters that are meaningful in an expressivist way, they will
have to be approached dialogically. The problem for the contemporary Buberian, of
Steven Kepnes sirnilarly refers to Buber’s move from “romantic hermeneutic method to what.
[he] caII[s] his ‘dialogical hermeneutic method’ “(xiii). Elsewhere Kepnes refers to the latter as Buber’s
“post-rornantic herrneneutics” (44).
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course, is that the tendency in the acaderny has been to move in the opposite direction.
Hence Gadamer’s worry, which we can now identify as echoing Buber, about the rise of
scientisrn in ail disciplines.’4 Perhaps Iris Murdoch best descrïbed what is being rnissed
here when she declared that “{w]e are men and we are moral agents before we are
scientists” (34).
Part (ii) — Self and Other Revisited
On, now, to Buber’s critique ofrnodern episternology. As I shah show, it also shares
fundamental affinities with those ofthe hermeneuticists. In his essay, “Behayat
Ha’adarn, Iyunim Betoldote’a” (The Problem ofthe Human Being), Buber criticizes
modem metaphysics’ essentialist stance as epitornized in the Descartes’ cogito ‘I think
therefore I am.” Like Heidegger, Buber aims to show that this is comphicit in a
“forgetfulness of being,” although Buber, of course, does not use Heidegger’s
terrninology.’
Buber’s argument is that modem metaphysics overlooks the concrete relation to
being, the one that takes place prior to thought. In his “The Word That is Spoken,” he
specifies that this primordial form of relation can only be grasped as a movement of
attention. one that “wander[s] without meeting a word” (113). This, J suggest, is none
1 Indeed, Kepnes, also argues that “Btiber anticipated sorne ofthe most significant hermeneutic
principles developed by Hans-Georg Gadarner in bis Wahrheit und Methocle” (xiii).
15 As Buber writes about rnetaphysics’ “forgetfulness ofbeing”:
11ri5 rnrrn v’n n or 5t’t ,rnn’5v 5 nmn nn55 nrfl35w2 rn’w’tn r1t. -PDn5 5’ n ‘w’
‘r ,‘u7 en fO’n2 ‘n’t n 5 ,‘u,5 ‘rw ‘v 5.. rn’’ t’55 ,5v.’ rn’2’p”vn 5. n m’J D’
‘fl — ,7272 flJJfl — ‘flJfl’ ‘)NWD j’i .“71 flflYO fl)’? flWp12fl nvY5v)nJ D’nifl V DJD N7 n rnj
(11) «i5 ap’n nn’n 5 ,‘no -rn’n’ 5v’ nn nu N5N n’rn N ‘N .‘riri5 rnrm ‘n nn ,‘u’ N’n
“One can no longer recognize the whole personality and learn about the whole person from it unless one
consciously participates in it. . . As long as t am but ‘data’ to myseif, as long as t am but an ‘object,’ t
only kiiow the Adam [the generic personj as a thing among things. The wished for knowledge ofthe
whole is yet to corne. Only when I am ‘present’ — present alone — is it with me, is it conceivable. We do
flot know anything but the acttiality ofbeing present” (rny translation).
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other than what contemporary hermeneuticists identify as the pre-reflective practicat
background, the Being ofwhich ail beings-in-the-world are a part. Consider
commentator Dan Avnon’s daim that, to Buber. one can have a relation to what one is a
part of only because what is distant is also present; this, Avnon asserts, “constitutes a
complete dialogicai relation” (6). Everything, that is, interpreting man inciuded, is
connected to the background, i.e., to Being. Thought, then, when it arises, must folÏow
the more primordial relation, and indeed Avnon himsetfdescribes Buber’s “primal form
of relation” as a “background” (42). That said, there is a problem with Avnon’s account
wlien lie daims that the more primal form of relation to being is, for Buber, somehow
pre-linguistic: “[i}n the background ofa world mediated by thought is an original
position, that in which what is to be seen prior to the construct ofthought is revealed.
• [Buber advocatesï a direct relation to what is present, an attitude to being that is prior
to, and unrnediated by, language” (3). Avnon, it seems to me, can only equate the “prior
to the construct ofthought” with the “prior to, and unmediated by language” or the
‘prelinguistic relation to being” (9) because he fails to see that, for Buber, language is at
base symbolic rather than semiotic. Buber, that is, would surely object to Avnon’s daim
that “in Buber’s understanding, language” is “the external form ofthe movement of
thought” (9). for Buber, pre-reflective practice is stili interpretive, albeit unconsciously
or implicitly so, and thus stiil expressivist, stili dialogical. Otherwise put, pre-reflective
agency, in which one participates in practices out of habit, is still linguistic, which is
why practices are worthy analogues to texts (land Thou 58-59).
Behind the Cartesian cogito, as I noted earlier, is modem metaphysics’ desire to
master, to have power over the other by “capturing” it in a theory. Poststructuralisrn, as
87
we have seen, would deconstruct this “will to power” by reversing, to a degree, the
asymmetrical relation between self and other that it asserts. And hermeneutics affirms
instead die symmetrical relation between genuine interlocutors. Now Ruber’s I-You
mode of relation is, it seems to me, a version ofthe latter. Consider Buber’s emphasis on
the reciprocity and mutuality ofthe dialogical relation. As lie puts it, the I-You relation
is “the genuinely reciprocal meeting in the fullness of life between one active existence
and another” (qtd. in Friedman 18). Elsewhere, lie writes that genuine dialogue, as
distinct from monologue, is a state in which “each of the participants really has in mmd
the other or others in their present and particular being and tums to them with the
intention of estabÏishing a living mutual relation between himself and them”
‘Dialogue” 19). “Being, lived in dialogue,” he continues, “receives even in extreme
dereliction a harsh and strengthening sense of reciprocity; being, lived in monologue,
will not, even in the tenderest intimacy, grope out over the outlines ofthe self’
(“Dialogue” 20).
Buber’s conception ofreciprocity is key. By it he does not mean to refer to the
reciprocal “give and take” of individuals involved in a purely instrumental relationship.
Rather, he wishes to invoke nothing other than “the Between” fundamental to the
genuine I-You interpersonal relation. As Avnon describes it, “the Between,” is “a
refined essence that permeates the social sphere when a person’s attitude to being
originates in transformed relation to self and others” (8). The Between, then, is a mode
of relation in which there is no independent self/subject opposed to some independent
otlier/object but a background shared by both “self’ and “other.” Buber sometimes likes
to articulate this by saying that, when two people rneet, “there is an essential remainder
88
common to each of them that reaches out beyond the specific sphere of each. That
remainder is the basic interliuman reality, the ‘sphere ofthe between’ “(Atterton,
Calarco, and friedman 2). Hence the importance ofreferring to an I-”You” rather than
an I-”Thou” relation, for the latter has asymmetricaf connotations, the respect due to a
Ihou being that accorded to a being — or rather an ‘otherwise than being” — that
transcends the everyday. This is flot at ail Buber’s intention.
Reference to the “otherwise than being” recalis Levinas, and it is interesting to
note that Levinas has explicitly criticized the reciprocity central to Buber’s 1-Thou
relation (“Martin Buber” 32). Levinas does so because he believes that this reciprocity
“remains the tie between two separated freedoms. . . [where] the ineluctable character
ofisolated subjectivity is underestimated” (Time 93-94). Levinas’s complaint, that is, is
that the I-You relationship is insensitive to the real otherness of the other. In attempting
to know that other dialogically, Levinas believes, one oniy confines him or ber and,
ultirnately, succumbs to the temptations ofthe metaphysical tradition.
But white there may be something to this, I think Levinas is wrong to reduce the
I-You relation to the asymmetrical “power over” 50 dear to metaphysics. Consider
Buber’s opposition ofthe kind of dialogue he favors to what he calis “reflexion”:
[w]hen a man withdraws from accepting with his essential being another
person in bis particularity — a paiïicularity which is by no means to be
circumscribed by the circle of bis own self, and though it substantially
touches and moves lis soul is in no way immanent in it — and lets the
other exist only as his own experience, only as a ‘part ofrnyself.” (23-24)
$9
The intent here, surely, is anything but reductive. Where Levinas went astray, I suspect,
is in imparting the notion of”two separate freedoms” to Buber’s interlocutors. But
Buberian reciprocity, as we have seen. is flot a quality of relation between two separate
entities. Perhaps Levinas hirnself carne to recognize this, for in a later work lie had
sornething very complimentary to say about Buber’s approach: ‘[a1ny reflection on the
alterity ofthe other in bis or her irreducibility to the objectivity ofobjects and the beings
of beings must recognize the new perspective Buber opened — and find encouragement
in it” (Outside 41).
I believe that that perspective is nowhere better exernplified than in Buber’s
exegetical practice, especially in bis rnany writings on the Bible as welI as Hasidic
narratives. In order to give an account of this practice, as well as to demonstrate its
fundarnental sirnilarity to that ofthe hermeneuticists, I turn now to an identification of
what seern to me to be the three most fundamental characteristics of Buber’ s approach to
interpretation.
First, there is the fact that Buber’s criticism does flot adhere to any logical
argurnentative structure. Indeed, lie may even be accused of going to the opposite
extreme, since his texts are sometimes as enigmatic and allusive as those ofHeidegger’s
or, for that matter, Derrida’s. Like these two, moreover, Buber oflen chooses to present
his own phllosophy through his interpretations oftexts, thus ernphasizing how we can
learn frorn fiction as much as, perhaps even more than, from non-fiction.’6
Second, Buber emphasizes the centrality of “listening” to good interpretation. As
Michael Fishbane lias put it, Buber’s biblical hermeneutics constitute “training for
16 See, for instance, his account ofthe Biblical story ofAdam and Eve’s flrst sin in Israel and the
World (73), in which he criticizes modem metaphysics, and his Tales ofthe Masters, a translation of rnany
Hasidic stories.
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hurnan listening” ($8). The Buberian interpreter, it is clear, must listen to the text in
order to arrive at a good account of its meaning. Consider Buber on the repeated use of
the term “to open” in a particular biblical text:
[y]ou pose and listen to this repetition, to what it says. This is the way of
Torah barniqra [i.e., instruction, teaching, in the scripture], which
frequently does not interpret the substance of the virtue discussed but
rather enables it to open of itself, not in the language of secret or allegory
but in this significant repetition, perceptible to every reader and every
bearer who listens with the heart. (“People” 14)
In order to truÏy hear a text. Buber daims, one bas to be open to it’s “voice,” the reader
ofthe Bible has to let “himselfbe addressed by the voice that speaks to him in the
Hebrew language” (“Biblical Humanism” 213). Thus does he cail for readers to read
with an “openness to believe” (21) or an “open-heartedness” (the “literal” translation of
the Hebrew b èetchon lev).’7 Indeed, in this particular essay, the Hebrew root PaTaCU
(to open, nn) is repeated several times (42, 5$, 60) and as Steven Kepnes has wTitten —
and as bis book’s titie, The Text as Thon. suggests, Buber considers bis dialogical
approach as paradigmatic for interpreting texts (xiii, 58).
This opeimess to the text is manifested in the interpreter’s willingness to
transform hirnself. Again and again this point appears in Buber’s writings on the Bible.
for example:
17 See Buber’s “Ben Doraynu Vehamiqra,” where he writes:
nriu 5 25 JflT12 ,J))1 r1ww5 D’2”fl )M’V) ,fl)32 TD)5 ‘2T1 1)N. . . o’,ri pun 5 rrnn r5»
.158) “2iTD 225 DT12
“I am flot dernanding a return to scripture. . . only that we face up to our conternporaty obligations with
an open heartedness ofbelief, as it is written” (rny translation).
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[The reader] must place himself anew before the book which has become
new, withhold nothing, and allow what happens between it and himself to
happen. He does flot know which saying, which image from this source
will seize and remold him, from where the spirit will rush in and
penetrate him in order to embody itself anew in his life; but he is open.
(qtd. in Kepnes 53-53)
Flsewhere: the interpreter of “the biblical Word [interprets] in order to hearken to or to
take offense at it. . . to [confront] . . . his tife with the Word” (“Man” 4). Then
“[w]henever we truly read it [i.e. the Biblical text], our self-understanding is renewed
and deepened” (“Dialogue Between Heaven and Earth” 216).
Third and finally, Buber, in bis biblical interpretations, as elsewhere in his
philosophical works, emphasizes the importance ofthe concrete, ofthe context to
genuine dialogue (“Between” 12; Friedman 10, 12, 19). Buber, then, rejects the
metaphysical tradition’s favoring of abstract, universal, “detached and formally
perfected” words, for it “tends [toward the] monological” (“Biblical Humanism” 215).18
As such, we may say that Buber’s biblical hermeneutics aims to situate the text in a
concrete and dynamic living context.
Conclusion — Buber’s Levitical Judaism: A Dialogical Approach
Hermeneutics is mainly associated today with thinkers such as Heidegger, Gadamer,
Ricoeur and Taylor. The first two ofthese, in particular, have written ofthe ancient
Greek sources oftheir approach. But recognizing Buber’s place arnong this group
18 Indeed he daims that Plato’s Dialogues are in fact monological in nature, as they manifest an
“elernent of immutability in communication” (“Biblical Humanism” 215).
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suggests the existence ofa different source, one rooted in Jerusalem and not Athens.1°
Not the Jerusalem of the rabbis, however, the forentnners of contemporary difference
philosophy, since, following Blattberg, I want to suggest that we recognize the approach
ofthe Levitical priests ofbiblical Judaism’s pre-monarchic period as a forerunner to
contemporary hermeneutics.
Who were the Levites? In pre-monarchic Israeli society, there were basically two
types ofpriests. The first, the Levites, can be traced from Moses through to Abiathar,
one oftwo high priests ofDavid’s temple, and his foltowers; the second, the Aaronites,
from Moses’ brother Aaron to Abiathar’s rival the high priest Zadok and his followers.
The Levites essentially dominated the priesthood in pre-monarchic tirnes, prior to its
centralization in Jerusalem by King David. The Aaronites, by contrast, especially when
Zadok took over as the high priest following Solomon’s exile of Abiathar, took a highly
theoretical, one might even say metaphysical, approach (they are the Sadducees against
whorn, as we recait from the previous chapter, the Pharisees rebelled).
As Blattberg suggests, Levite practice affirmed rnany fundamentals that reappear
in contemporary hermeneutics. The Levitical priests, we have been told, were teachers
ofthe law: “They shall teach Jacob thyjudgments, and Israel thy law” (Dent. 33:10; qtd.
in Blattberg, “Loving Wisdom” 27; see also Lev. 10:8-11; Jer. 18:18; Ezek. 7:26). And
if one adds to this the reference to priests in the Jewish EncycÏopaedia as “the
authoritative inteipreters ofthe Law,” one begins to suspect that hermeneutics was
central to their profession (ernphasis added 193). Indeed, as Blattberg points out, one of
the Levites’ roles was to receive confessions, during which they were responsible for
Both Grondin and Blattberg point to the Greek sources ofherrneneutics, but where Grondin follows
Gadarner in identi1’ing them with Ptato’s thought (2 1-22), Blattberg points instead to Piato’s rivais, the
Sophists (“Loving Wisdorn” 25-27).
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“reconciling” the guilty with God (“Loving Wisdom” 28; Num. 5:6ff Lev. 4:20, 31;
5:10; 6:7). This was done by their manipulation ofthe Urim and Tummim, a kind of
dice that gave yes or no answers to inquiries (Deut. 33:2; Judges 17:5-13). Yet as Max
Weber has shown, the role ofthe Levite priests was far more compÏicated than simply
applying the rules of some game, for “everything depended on the way that the question
was put” (179). Indeed so many prelirninary questions had to be settled before a
particular one could be placed before God that not much was left to be determined by
the Urim and Tummim. What we have here, then, is a highty dialogical, and thus
interpretive, process. Indeed the emphasis on questions echoes Gadamer, for whom
“[tihe hermeneuticaÏ task becornes of itselfa questioning ofthings” (Truth 238). This ail
suggests that the Levitical priests had to be attentive to the particularity of each person’ s
unique situation, hence sensitive to the context in which they made their judgments. No
surprise, then, that Weber identifies the central characteristic ofpriesthood in general as
an enterprise “permanently associated with particular norms, places and tirnes, and
related to specific social groups” (qtd. in Blattberg, “Loving Wisdom” 28). And as we
have seen, sensitivity to the particularities ofthe context requires the hermeneuticist to
be open to transforrn himself and thus genuinely to listen to his or ber interlocutor. No
wonder, then, that when Buber refers to the Jewish tradition he asserts that “[t]he Jew of
antiquity is more ofa ‘hearing-man,’ tban a ‘seeing-man’ “(qtd. in Kepnes 167). So,
like the Hermes of Greek mythology, the messenger oftbe gods, the Levites may be
described as the dialogical bridge between the Israelites and their God. Perhaps, then,
they were the first herrneneuticists.
Conclusion
In a certain sense interpretation probably is te-creation.
Hans-George Gadamer, Truth and Method
The original opening of interpretation essentially
signifies that there will aiways be rabbis and poets.
And two interpretations of interpretation.
Jacques Derrida, Writing and DUference
In April 1981, at the Goethe Institute in Paris, Jacques Derrida and Hans-Georg
Gadamer met for the first time in a public, academic setting. The encounter has been the
subject ofrnuch speculation. Ail agree that, though each foliowed the other (Gadamer
presented first, then Derrida, and then Gadamer followed by Derrida again) it is difficuit
to daim that the two participated in a genuine “dialogue.” As Derrida hirnself described
his first response to Gadamer, it was doubtful whether “anything was taking place here
other than improbable debates, counter-questioning, and inquiries into unfindable
objects ofthought” (“Three Questions” 52).
In his opening presentation, Gadamer defended Heidegger’s reading of
Nietzsche as a metaphysical thinker. In so doing, he was suggesting that Heidegger was
the more radical ofthe two thinkers. Given Nietzsche’s influential role on the
development of contemporary difference philosophy, Gadamer was thus implying that,
contrary to the daims of poststructuralists such as Derrida, the hermeneutics that
Heidegger inaugurated should not be situated within the metaphysical tradition. When it
came to Derrida’s tum to respond, however, he posed three questions, none ofwhich
dealt with Gadamer’s arguments. Rather, they invoked a point that Gadamer mentioned
Fred R. Dalirnayr, for example, bas characterized the exchange as “disjointed and non-dialogical”
(77).
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only briefly, one about the necessity of interlocutors to be open to what the other has to
say. Moreover, Derrida merely reiterated his position as regards Reidegger and
Nietzsche, thus appearing to ignore Gadamer’ s presentation. Indeed, Derrida did flot
even mention the latter’s narne once.
Given what I have written above about poststructuralism, Derrida’s response
should flot corne as such a surprise — though it is clear that Gadamer did not expect it. If
anything, what is surprising is Gadamer’s disappointrnent, expressed in a letter he later
wrote about the encounter, that “a conversation between two total!y independent
developers” of Heidegger’s thought did flot arise (“Letter to Dalimayr” 93). This
suggests that Gadarner simply does flot appreciate the extent to which Derrida’s
approach differs from his own. Indeed, the goal of this thesis was flot to oppose the two
but to distingziisÏz between them; as Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer have
put it as regards Gadamer and Derrida’s encounter in Paris, “their paths unfold on
different planes” for they stand to each other “in a relationship of alterity, of non
oppositional difference” (9).
As we have seen, Gadamer’s herrneneutics, along with Buber’s own dialogical
philosophy, ernphasize not only the importance of the willingness of interlocutors to
engage in dialogue but also how that dialogue relies upon a certain cornmonality, a
shared background that both have referred to as the “between.” This between, we recail,
Gadamer has defined as “the true locus ofherrneneutics” (Truth 263), and it is
something characterized by mutuality and symmetry, by the desire to reconcile
disagreernent and hence achieve a shared, if albeit aiways provisional, understanding.
Hence the question posed by Gadamer during his presentation: “How do the
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comrnonality of meaning, which is buift up in conversation, and the irnpenetrability of
the otherness ofthe other mediate each other?” (“Text and Interpretation” 27). Yet as
Josepli Sirnon points out in bis comrnentary on the encounter, this question already
presupposes that “the cornrnonality ofmeaning” and “the otherness ofthe other” is
something that can, in principle, be mediated, i.e., that othemess is something that is
meant to be understood (164). Hence Gadamer’s daim that ‘[w]hoever opens his mouth
wants to be understood; otherwise, one would neither speak nor write” (“Reply” 55).
Yet this goes too far. Derrida’s non-response to Gadamer makes exactly this
point. Indeed, Derrida does so because he believe that, ultimately, Gadamer’s daim on
behalfofthe universality ofhermeneutics is metaphysical and hence should not be
abided.2 Although I have argued in this work that this is a mistake, Derrida stiil seerns to
me to be correct if we interpret him as rejecting this universality. For the fact is that
there are “others” out there which lie beyond even herrneneutics wide bounds of
understanding.
In a sense, however, Derrida hirnself can be faulted with making bis own false
daim on behaif of universality. As we have seen, he ultimately wants to suggest that
there are no interpretations, only illusory readings (Critchley 93). Ostensibly, these all
need to be deconstructed, for we must aim for the creativity, the openness to the other,
that cornes from the back and forth of deconstructive subversion and reinscription. As
we bave seen, like Levinas’ philosophy and the rabbinic ]udaisrn upon which it draws,
2 would suggest that Derrida is making the sanie point when, in his encounter with the theoretical
philosopher John Searle, he asserts that “[w]hat T like about this ‘confrontation’ is that I don’t know if it is
quite taking place, if it ever will be able, or will have been able, quite, to take place; or if it does, between
whorn or what?” (“Lirnited, Inc.” 72).
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this creativity is Deirida’s central aim. It is why, for him, ail interpretations are rnerely
misinterpretations waiting to be unveiled.
Both poststructuralism and hermeneutics, then, can be accused of failing to
distinguish adequately between creation and interpretation, something evident in the
quotations serving as epigraphs for this chapter. No wonder Derrida refuses to converse
with Gadamer: while the latter sits there listening intently, striving to understand, the
former wishes instead to create. The two are simply at cross purposes.
This suggests that it would be wrong to daim that either is in any sense superior
to the other. for their ends are utterly different. They cannot be ranked because there is
surely a tirne and place to create as much as there is to interpret. It ail depends on who,
and where, one is.
0f late, it has become fashionable to decry the “fashion” of “theory” within
departments ofliterary studies, as well as to proclaim its demise. It may indeed be true
that more philosophical approaches to the study of literature are today on the wane.
However, this cannot be. as many have suggested, because these were simply a mistake.
On the contrary, aIl who are open to their niessage must recognize that they have, in
their own ways, contributed to both the creation and interpretation of literature. The
beauty of poststructuralism and the truth of hermeneutics should flot be denied.
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